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NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

**INSECURITY IN THE DRC: THE OBSTACLE TO
PEACE AND STABILITY**

by

Badura A. Hakim

December 2016

Thesis Advisor:
Second Reader:

Heather S. Gregg
Anna Simons

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INSECURITY IN THE DRC: THE OBSTACLE TO PEACE AND STABILITY

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

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from the

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ABSTRACT

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has experienced complex warfare that has involved various neighboring nations beginning in the mid-1990s. In particular, the protected presence of armed groups has been a major obstacle to peace. Based on the best practices in Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration (DDR) programs, this thesis constructs an analytical framework and uses a longitudinal case study of the DRC to analyze four DDR programs initiated in the DRC from 2002 to 2009, with the goal of better understanding why they failed. The thesis finds that an unrealistically short timeline, insufficient funds, an overemphasis on disarmament, and the failure to include all key warring parties in the DDR process created major obstacles to success in short-term DDR efforts in the DRC. Long-term reintegration efforts have been hindered by poor linkages between the DDR and security sector reform (SSR), a lack of government capacity to implement and oversee reintegration programs, a chronically weak economic sector, and continued tensions with DRC's neighbors, particularly Rwanda. Given these findings, implementing a viable DDR program should require a minimum of 15 years of commitment; this would allow for comprehensive SSR, jobs programs, community-based activism, an improved economy, and better relations with neighboring countries.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION.....	1
A.	OVERVIEW.....	1
B.	THESIS QUESTION.....	2
C.	METHODOLOGY.....	2
D.	FINDINGS.....	3
E.	ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS.....	4
II.	DDR PROGRAMS AND STABILIZING FRAGILE STATES.....	5
A.	INTRODUCTION.....	5
B.	WHAT IS DDR?	6
C.	LONG-TERM REINTEGRATION AND FRAGILE STATES.....	8
D.	MEASURING SUCCESS IN DDR PROGRAMS	14
E.	CONCLUSION	19
III.	THE CONGOLESE WAR AND DDR PROGRAM.....	21
A.	BACKGROUND	21
B.	BRIEF OVERVIEW OF DRC CONFLICT	22
C.	MAJOR REBEL GROUPS, ETHNIC MILITIAS, AND GOVERNMENT FORCES.....	27
1.	Rebel Groups.....	27
2.	Ethnic Militias in Ituri.....	31
3.	Government Security Forces	33
D.	PEACE ACCORDS AND DDR PROGRAMS IN THE DRC	34
E.	THE DRC TODAY	44
F.	CONCLUSION	47
IV.	FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS	49
A.	ANALYSIS OF DDR PROGRAMS IN THE DRC	49
B.	ANALYSIS OF DEMOBILIZATION, DISARMAMENT, AND REPATRIATION EFFORTS	50
1.	Timeline	51
2.	Insufficient Funds	54
3.	Overemphasizing Disarmament	54
C.	REINTEGRATION EFFORTS AND LONG-TERM SUCCESS.....	56
1.	Law and Justice.....	56
2.	Economic Development	58
3.	Relationships with Neighboring Countries.....	59

D.	RECOMMENDATIONS.....	61
1.	Think Long Term.....	61
2.	Think Holistically—DDR, Security Sector Reform, and Rule of Law.....	63
3.	Measures of Success.....	64
LIST OF REFERENCES.....		69
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST		77

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1.	Summary of major armed groups	31
Table 2.	Summary of major ethnic groups in the DRC war	33
Table 3.	Summary of the major government forces.....	34
Table 4.	Summary of the DDR programs in DRC	43

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ADF	Allied Democratic Forces
AFDL	Alliance des Forces Democratiques pour la Liberation du Congo-Zaire
CAR	Central African Republic
CONADER	National Commission of Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reinsertion
DCR	Disarmament and community reintegration
DDR (RR)	Disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, repatriation, and rehabilitation
FAC	Forces Armees Congolaises
FAR	Forces Armees Rwandaises, (Rwanda Armed Forces)
FARDC	Forces Armees de la Republique Democratique du Congo
FDD	Forces for Defense of Democracy
FDLR	Forces Democratiques des Liberation du Rwanda
FLC	Front de Liberation du Congo
FNI	Nationalist Integrationist Front
FPDC	Popular Front for Democracy in Congo
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
MLC	Movement for the Liberation of Congo
MONUC	Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies au Congo
PNDDR	National Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration program
RCD	Congolese Rally for Democracy
RCD-G	Congolese Rally for Democracy—Goma
RCD-K	Congolese Rally for Democracy—Kisangani
RCD-ML	Congolese Rally for Democracy—Mouvement de Liberation
RCD-N	Congolese Rally for Democracy—National
RPA	Rwandan Patriotic Army

SRAREC	Congolese Programme de Stabilisation et de Reconstruction des Zones Sortant des Conflicts Armes
UN	United Nations
UPC	Union of Congolese Patriots (Union des Patriots Congolais)
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. OVERVIEW

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has experienced warfare that has involved various neighboring nations since the mid-1990s. In the eastern part of the country, the protracted presence of foreign armed groups, Congolese militias, and rebel forces further complicated the situation in the DRC and have become a major obstacle to peace and security. These armed groups have violated human rights, including murder, kidnapping, torture of civilians, recruitment of children as soldiers, and demolishing houses or settlements by fire.¹ In addition to these atrocities, mass rapes and sexual punishment have also been applied as weapons against the population. The conflict has affected millions of lives, and millions died since the onset of the Congo war.²

In an effort to halt the warfare, the DRC signed the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement in July 1999.³ This landmark agreement led the UN Security Council to pass Resolution 1279 on November 30, 1999, which established the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), with the goal of helping to facilitate the ceasefire agreement and disengage all warring parties. Three years later, on December 17, 2002, the main Congolese faction signed the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement, which called for a program of Demobilization, Disarmament, and Reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants.⁴

DDR programs are typically implemented to assist ex-combatants in transitioning from military to civilian life. The main goal of the DDR program in Congo was to establish an environment conducive to peace and to restore security, which in turn, would

¹ “Congo (DR) Conflict,” Thomson Reuters Foundation News, last modified December 9, 2013, <http://news.trust.org/spotlight/Congo-DR-conflict/?tab=background>.

² “Ending Impunity for Sexual Violence,” Human Rights Watch: Democratic Republic of Congo, June 10, 2014, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/06/10/democratic-republic-congo-ending-impunity-sexual-violence>.

³ Jeanne M. Haskin, *The Tragic State of the Congo: From Decolonization to Dictatorship* (New York, NY: Algora Publishing, 2005), 131–133, <https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/>.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 132–133.

allow the Congolese government to set the prerequisite terms to reduce poverty and uphold economic development.⁵ With international support, the DRC created four distinct DDR programs with the goal of ending hostilities in the country: a DDR Reintegration and Resettlement (RR) program aimed at repatriating foreign fighters; two national programs aimed at demobilizing a variety of Congolese rebel and militia groups; and one program that focused specifically on the province of Ituri.

Despite efforts to end hostilities and stabilize the state, the population has continued to experience insecurities and violence that has prevented civilians from performing daily activities, such as attending schools and engaging in the economy. Hostilities in the eastern part of the DRC have been particularly bad, and new armed groups have emerged despite the peace accords and DDR programs. Ultimately, the protracted violence and lack of security within the country and region demonstrate that these DDR programs were unsuccessful, especially as ex-combatants returned to their original job as fighters.

B. THESIS QUESTION

This thesis seeks to examine the following question: why did the DDR (RR) programs fail in the Democratic Republic of Congo?

C. METHODOLOGY

To investigate this question, this thesis uses a longitudinal case study to analyze the DDR programs in the DRC from 2002 to 2009. The thesis begins by reviewing the literature on best practices of DDR and will construct a framework with which to analyze the DDR program in the DRC. In particular, this thesis considers the following questions and their corresponding measures of effectiveness to analyze factors that might have led to the failure of DDR in the DRC:

- What measures were taken to ensure security, law, and justice throughout the country? What were the shortcomings of these efforts?

⁵ Jean A.P. Clément, *Postconflict Economics in Sub-Saharan Africa: Lessons from the Democratic Republic of Congo*, Volume 2 of *Studies in Methods - United Nations*, International Monetary Fund, 2004, <https://books.google.com/books?>

- What economic opportunities existed for ex-combatants and the general population more broadly? What long-term efforts were undertaken to reintegrate ex-combatants into civilian life? If vocational training, education, and job assistance were offered, how successful were they and how was progress monitored?
- What efforts were initiated to establish good relations with neighboring countries?

This thesis focuses on how security, law and justice, economic opportunity, and regional relations were considered, if at all, in the DRC and what barriers prevented positive results from being achieved by the four DDR programs that were initiated to sustain peace and security in the DRC after the 2002 Pretoria Peace Agreement.

D. FINDINGS

This thesis finds that an unrealistically short timeline, insufficient funds, an overemphasis on disarmament, and the failure to include all key warring parties in the DDR process created major obstacles for even short-term efforts to demobilize armed individuals and groups in the DRC. Long-term reintegration efforts have been hindered by poor linkages between DDR and security sector reform and the continued need for ad hoc community-based security to fill the gap created by insufficient and poorly trained government forces. Long-term efforts at reintegrating former soldiers into civilian life also have been hampered by a lack of government institutions and an insufficient capacity to implement and oversee reintegration programs. Moreover, a chronically weak economic sector and lack of jobs, along with continued tension with DRC's neighbors, particularly Rwanda, have prevented DDR successes.

Given these findings, this thesis proposes that the timeframe for effective DDR(RR) programs in the DRC should be a minimum of 15 years to allow enough time to conduct a comprehensive program that includes security sector reform, jobs programs, community-based activism, a focus on the economy, and improved relations with the DRC's neighboring countries.

E. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS

The thesis proceeds as follows: Chapter II provides an overview of literature on DDR, focusing on the basic steps of the program and their purpose. From this discussion, the thesis proposes a framework for analyzing the DDR programs in the DRC, focusing on security, law and justice; economic opportunity; and good relations with neighboring countries—as well as their corresponding measures of effectiveness—to better understand what led to the failure of DDR programs in the DRC. Chapter III provides background on the wars in the DRC, the peace accords created to halt hostilities, and various efforts to restore peace and stability through DDR programs. Chapter IV uses the framework from Chapter II to provide an analysis of the DDR programs in the DRC, and concludes with recommendations for strengthening DDR efforts in the DRC moving forward, and for DDR programs in general.

II. DDR PROGRAMS AND STABILIZING FRAGILE STATES

A. INTRODUCTION

Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) processes aim to transition legally and illegally armed individuals from combatants to civilian life.⁶ DDR, sometimes referred as DDR(RR) after adding the concepts of Repatriation and Rehabilitation, can include social and economic development, humanitarian assistance, politics, security measures, and the creation or retraining of armed forces.⁷ According to the UN's DDR Resources Center, "the objective of the DDR process is to contribute to security and stability in post-conflict environments so that recovery and development can begin."⁸ DDR, in other words, is an integral part of peacebuilding and sustainable development in post-conflict environments.⁹

Successful DDR programs, however, require notable time, resources, and clear goals to be successful. The effectiveness of the DDR program depends on the ability of the state to promote humanitarian assistance, economic and social development, armed forces, and security for the political arena in building a nation.¹⁰ In post-conflict countries, these very aspects of the state are often weak and ineffective, making implementation of DDR programs difficult and often unsuccessful.

This chapter outlines each of the steps in the DDR(RR) process, noting the different goals and challenges in each step. The chapter focuses specifically on the

⁶ W. Andy Knight, "Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding in Africa an Overview," *African Security* 1, no.1 (2008): 27, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/19362200802285757>.

⁷ Albert Caramés, Vicenç Fisas Armengol, and Daniel Luz, "Analysis of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) Existing in the World during 2005," February 2006, Escola de Cultura de Pau. <http://escolapau.uab.cat/img/programas/desarme/ddr001i.pdf>.

⁸ "What Is DDR?" United Nations Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Resource Centre. accessed February 25, 2016, http://www.unddr.org/what-is-ddr/introduction_1.aspx.

⁹ Alan Bryden and Vincenza Scherrer, "The DDR_SSR Nexus: Concepts and Policies," in *Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration and Security Sector Reform. Insights from UN Experience in Afghanistan, the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of Congo*, ed. Alan Bryden, Vincenza Scherrer (Vienna: LIT Verlag GmbH & Co., 2012), 5.

¹⁰ Knight, "Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding in Africa," 28.

Reintegration phase of the DDR process and outlines the social and governmental resources necessary for long-term success in demobilizing illegally armed combatants after internal conflicts.

B. WHAT IS DDR?

Typically, DDR programs begin with a call for ex-combatants to disarm. The rationale behind disarmament is that ex-combatants with weapons pose security threats to the state, civilians, and countries bordering the conflict state. The UN mission's scheme paved the way for development activities that are intended to bestow stability and security in a country recovering from war and to rejuvenate the society, politics, and economy.¹¹ The disarmament component of DDR usually includes sorting, controlling, recording, verifying, and destroying weapons and explosives.¹² In some cases, ex-combatants are given cash for their arms in a "buy back program."¹³ In Sierra Leone, for example, ex-combatants were paid USD 150 cash for surrendering any weapon.¹⁴ Neutral international agencies and technical assistance can promote the planning and implementation of the demilitarization process.¹⁵ For example, the United Nations Monitoring Mission for Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) performed the overall task of disarmament in both countries.¹⁶

Demobilization is a course of action for regulating and controlling the transformation of former soldiers from combatant to noncombatant status.¹⁷ Demobilization often starts with disarmed ex-combatants being confined to designated

¹¹ Ibid., 28.

¹² Martin Edmonds, Greg Mills, and Terence McNamee, "Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and Local Ownership in the Great Lakes: The Experience of Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of Congo," *African Security* 2, no. 1 (2009): 33, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/19362200902766383>.

¹³ Nat J. Coletta, Markus Kostner, and Ingo Wiederhofer, "Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration: Lessons and Liabilities in Reconstruction," In *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences*, ed. Robert I. Rotberg (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), 173.

¹⁴ Ibid., 173.

¹⁵ Ibid., 173.

¹⁶ Ibid., 173.

¹⁷ Ibid., 173.

centers or camps before being returned to society.¹⁸ In addition to persuading the former combatants to lay down weapons and stop fighting, neutral international agencies provide a variety of assistance in the form of financial support, job offers, or technical tools that help them to begin a new life.¹⁹ Also, these programs often provide opportunities for the government to compile information and figures on the social wellbeing and economic development of the former soldiers, which the government can use to remove the obstacles that prevent these individuals from restarting noncombatant life.²⁰ For example, during the demobilization phase in Uganda, the state discovered that 17 percent of the former soldiers were infected with HIV/AIDS; to re-integrate those soldiers, the DDR program added a medical package.²¹

Reinsertion is a preparatory step in the rehabilitation process that provides moral and psychological support to ex-combatants during the demobilization period. The goal of the activity is to provide supportive means to former soldiers and sometimes to their families for a short period. Tangible support can include food, clothing, shelter, health care, mental development, and technical training.²² Often international organizations can provide these immediate and short-term necessities.

Reintegration refers to the ways and means to strengthen skills and capabilities of former soldiers that contribute to these individuals achieving social and economic reintegration. This phase of the program may provide skills for self-employment and assistance finding a regular job, or economic assistance.²³ In East Timor, for example, the government offered four reintegration packages to former combatants, including coastal

¹⁸ Edmonds, Mills, and McNamee, "Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and Local Ownership in the Great Lakes," 33.

¹⁹ Kimberly Theidon, "Transitional Subjects: The Disarmament, Demobilization, and the Reintegration of Former Combatants in Colombia," *The International Journal of Transitional Justice*, 1, (2007): 66–90, doi:10.1093/ijtj/ijm011.

²⁰ Coletta, Kostner, and Wiederhofer, "Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration," 174.

²¹ Ibid., 174.

²² Edmonds, Mills, and McNamee, "Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and Local Ownership in the Great Lakes," 33.

²³ Theidon, "Transitional Subjects," 71.

fishing, small urban micro-enterprises, ranching, and uplands agriculture.²⁴ Reintegration is typically the most expensive and time-consuming stage in the DDR process and, if done well, successfully transitions fighters back to being peaceful and productive citizens.

In some cases, additional steps to the DDR program are added, including repatriation and resettlement of foreign combatants. For example, MONUC was responsible for registering foreign civilian refugees from Rwanda, Uganda, and South Sudan, and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was responsible for repatriating foreign civilians and armed forces.²⁵ The Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Commission was in charge of the resettlement of ex-combatants from Rwanda, the Ugandan Amnesty Commission was accountable for the relocation of Ugandan armed forces, and the South Sudan Commission for DDR was in charge of troops from South Sudan.²⁶

C. LONG-TERM REINTEGRATION AND FRAGILE STATES

The reintegration phase in DDR programs, in particular, is the hardest part of effectively transitioning fighters to civilian life because implementing these programs requires a functioning government and healthy social and political institutions to work together. Almost by definition, post-conflict states are politically and socially weak; they have gone through a violent collapse of the state, and new leaders have emerged with the goal of rebuilding state institutions that collapsed during the war period. Reconstructing the country is no small task—it requires leaders, individuals, and groups committed to the process of state formation.²⁷

Several scholars posit the necessary components and institutions of the state that need repair following collapsed or conflict ridden states. Jens Meierhenrich, for example,

²⁴ Coletta, Kostner, and Wiederhofer, “Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration,” 176.

²⁵ “DDR/RR Partners,” United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DR Congo, accessed March 12, 2016, <http://monusco.unmissions.org/en/ddrrr-partners.html>.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Jens Meierhenrich, “Forming States After Failure,” in *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences*, ed. Robert I. Rotberg (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), 154.

argues that the formation of a state after state failure depends on the interests of the decision makers, population, and stakeholders in establishing a functioning government. The new state is fragile because it has absorbed various people with differing interests and goals. Members need to form strong formal institutions that promote power, security, and wealth in society.²⁸ Meierhenrich notes that rebuilding the state requires the creation of strong formal institutions to develop representation, rights, power, influence and other valuable resources centered on the rule of law and bureaucracy. Legal systems and bureaucratic administration enable governments to exercise power and perform duties; weak or absent management, in turn, will lead the state to collapse.²⁹ Ultimately, when done successfully, formal institutions govern the social order in society and allow the state to prosper. Ultimately, these formal and informal institutions take time to grow. Implementing a successful DDR program in the absence of these institutions will most likely be challenging.

Ashraf Ghani et al. argue that healthy functioning states perform ten core functions that provide well-being for the population and build legitimacy between the government and the people.³⁰ These ten functions begin with a monopoly on the legitimate means of violence through a simple system, well organized with power to control violence throughout the country.³¹ Second, administrative control is the capacity of the government to reach across its territory.³² The state can achieve administrative control through a coherent set of rules that regulates and divides responsibilities from the top down and across the state.³³ Management of public finance is the third role of the state, with the sovereignty of a state measured through the management of public funds.³⁴

²⁸ Ibid., 154.

²⁹ Ibid., 155–158.

³⁰ Ashraf Ghani, Clare Lockhart, and Michael Carnahan, “Closing the Sovereignty Gap: An Approach to State-building,” Overseas Development Institute, September 2005, <https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/2482.pdf>.

³¹ Ibid., 6.

³² Ibid., 7.

³³ Ibid., 7.

³⁴ Ibid., 7.

An investment in human capital is the fourth function of a state. Human capital is crucial in building the capability for citizens to engage in economic, social, and development activities for the well-being of the country and population.³⁵ Fifth, robust state functions must protect and communicate the rights and duties of the citizens, regardless of economic status, tribe/ethnic group, gender or religious affiliation. Investment in the state's infrastructure is the sixth function; when done well, it promotes equal opportunity across the country, and reduces the migration of people to urban centers to seek services and abandon the rural areas.³⁶ Formation of the market is the seventh function of a healthy state, and offers citizens the privilege to own property, to implement agreements at regional or international level, and to construct corporate, insurance, bankruptcy, land, employment, and environmental laws.³⁷

Management of state assets is the eighth function of a healthy state, according to Ghani et al. This function includes the ability to regulate and license companies, corporations, individuals, and a country's natural resources with the goal of creating wealth in the state.³⁸ Engagement in international relations is the ninth function of the state, which enables states to form relationships with other countries, international bodies, and private agencies. These relationships, in turn, provide the opportunity to form treaties, make investments in human capital, develop international legal norms, and borrow money or ask for development aid.³⁹

The rule of law is the tenth function, which is the capability to align formal and informal rules of the state.⁴⁰ Like Meierhenrich, Ghani et al. argue that stable policies nurture rule of law, as do a rotation of rulers and the persistence of legal systems from one administration to the next. These norms and practices are among the critical

³⁵ Ibid., 7.

³⁶ Ibid., 8.

³⁷ Ibid., 8.

³⁸ Ibid., 8.

³⁹ Ibid., 8.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 9.

measurements of democracy, and these norms and practices allow the populace to choose its leaders. The rule of law also increases the overall credibility of the government.⁴¹

Ghani et al. stress that the integration of these ten functions by the government creates moral empowerment and opportunity for the population, which builds trust between the government and populace in turn.⁴² Conversely, the inability to perform one or many of these functions leads to contradictions, ineffective decision making, and a lack of trust between the government and the population, which could cause unrest or insurgency.⁴³

From this discussion, it is clear that states need the following resources to implement the successful reintegration of ex-combatants following prolonged internal conflict:

First, states need the rule of law. The rule of law provides impartiality as well as consistency. The rule of law also builds trust with the population; it creates the conditions for protecting the population, providing legitimate security, and ensuring that communities are lawfully and fairly reabsorbing ex-combatants. The rule of law and its enforcement also protects ex-combatants from reprisals, further encouraging illegally armed individuals to end fighting and resume civilian life. In addition to codifying laws, successfully safeguarding the rule of law requires a professional police force to enforce the laws. As both Meierhenrich and Ghani et al. argue, consistency and commitment will lead the population to obey and follow the rules. Ultimately, the rule of law restores order among individuals and societies in a state.

International organizations and the DRC government did attempt to establish rule of law as a means of stabilizing the state. Specifically, as will be described in Chapter III, international organizations established mobile courts in the DRC in order to promote the rule of law and justice. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) in 2011, in partnership with other organizations, provided logistics, administrative support, and

⁴¹ Ibid., 9.

⁴² Ibid., 9.

⁴³ Ibid., 9.

technical assistance to 15 mobile courts in the DRC that helped 330 cases to be heard and 193 perpetrators to be sentenced for crimes of sexual violence. Among those prosecuted were military officers who were convicted of sexual abuses and crimes against humanity.⁴⁴ The conviction of higher ranked officers in these mobile courts built confidence and trust within society and demonstrated that those who violated human rights during the conflict would face legal action regardless of their government position and status or military rank. However, a comprehensive legal program that included security sector reform (SSR) was not implemented and prevented state wide rule of law and its enforcement from becoming a reality.

Second, in order to institute a successful DDR program, and especially an effective reintegration strategy, the government needs to create programs aimed at motivating society to engage in the economic sector. Economic opportunity is critical for transitioning ex-combatants back into society. Without jobs and the potential to earn a living, combatants have little incentive to lay down their weapons and resume normal life which makes one wonder whether these economic programs might need to proceed. The final establishment of rule of law are proceed in tandem with government effort. As will be described in Chapter III, the DRC government is still its infancy and unable to develop the economy to its full potential. In the interim, the international community and nongovernmental organizations have taken responsibility for conducting development programs to mitigate violence in the country.

A particular challenge for job training and placements of ex-combatants is fairness. Security experts point to the risk of frustrated, skilled, unemployed ex-combatants returning to violence and crime if they are not well integrated back into society.⁴⁵ However, assisting ex-soldiers and neglecting recipient communities can lead to resentment about preferential treatment going to the very individuals that perpetrated

⁴⁴ “Strengthening the Rule of Law in Crisis-affected and Fragile Situations,” United Nations Development Program, Global Program, Annual Report, accessed on May 8, 2016, <http://www.ndrf.org.nz/assets/UNDP-Strengthening-the-Rule-of-Law-report.pdf>, 78.

⁴⁵ Lilli Banholzer, “When Do Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programmes Succeed?” Discussion paper, *German Development Institute* (August 2014): 17–18, https://www.die-gdi.de/uploads/media/DP_8.2014.pdf.

acts of violence against communities and the wider society. Hans Rouw and Rens Willems, for example, argue that providing skills and education to just one side can give the appearance that perpetrators are being rewarded for violent behavior, and can trigger retribution. Worse still, members of the younger generation might think that joining a militia is a strategy to get a job or job training when combatants receive assistance while noncombatants struggle on their own.⁴⁶ In order to address this problem, it is important that economic development programs create incentives for both former soldiers to lay down their weapons *and for the communities to which they return to welcome former fighters back*. Properly structured, economic integration programs can achieve both goals.⁴⁷

Third, conflict-affected states need to develop good relationships with neighboring countries in order to deter cross-border skirmishes, promote the existence of safe havens, and block the flow of weapons, as well as to encourage the successful repatriation of foreign fighters back to their country of origin. Frequently, internal conflicts are exacerbated by the ability of illegally armed combatants to base, organize, and train in neighboring countries, and without a good relationship between countries, these activities cannot be curtailed. By contrast, bad relationships create an environment in which neighboring countries host militias or armed groups and support them by providing training for destabilizing the other state. Good diplomatic relations between the war-affected country and its neighbors will not only improve communication and assist with the repatriation of refugees, militias, and armed forces, but it will help reduce tensions in society. As will be described in Chapter III, foreign soldiers on Congolese soil have intensified insecurity and have had a negative impact on DDR programs in the country.

⁴⁶ Hans Rouw and Rens Willems, "Connecting Community Security and DDR: Experiences from Eastern DRC," *Peace Security and Development Network* (April 2010): 21, <https://www.issafrica.org/armsnetfrica/sites/default/files/Community%20Security%20and%20DDR%20-%20DRC%20case%20study%20-%20final.pdf>.

⁴⁷ Jonah Leff, "The Nexus between Social Capital and Reintegration of Ex-combatants; A Case for Sierra Leone," Apr 29, 2008, 15, <http://www.accord.org.za/ajcr-issues/%EF%BF%BCthe-nexus-between-social-capital-and-reintegration-of-ex-combatants/>.

These three factors of reintegration—security and justice; economic opportunity; and good relations with neighboring countries—will be further explored in Chapter III, which looks specifically at DDR programs implemented in the DRC and why they did not succeed in creating lasting peace.

D. MEASURING SUCCESS IN DDR PROGRAMS

Measuring success in DDR programs requires understanding the short- and long-term goals of these programs and identifying benchmarks that show progress towards these goals. Ultimately, the goal of DDR programs should be to create lasting peace within communities, societies, and post-conflict states. This lasting peace can be measured by stability, peace, and security within a state, which allows development and economic growth, and the country's good relationships with its neighbors.

Too often, measures of performance are confused with measures of success in DDR programs, producing false positives for progress towards lasting peace and stability. For example, Paul Omach argues that the UN views DDR as a symbolic and confidence-building program, as opposed to a necessary step in peace building. In several cases, the UN has measured success by the number of weapons collected, as well as by how many ex-soldiers are demobilized. These short-term measures have allowed peace agreements to advance without interruption, but ultimately have not contributed to lasting peace.⁴⁸

Omach further stresses that actors conducting DDR programs need to integrate the formal and informal processes of returning ex-combatants to society to truly measure the success of the program. Informal demobilization for the ex-combatants often makes use of local rituals, cultures, norms, and beliefs with the goal of “cleansing” former fighters and returning them back to full membership in the community. For example, ex-soldiers from Uganda and Mozambique performed rituals that helped society to take them back. Specifically, the Acholi people of northern Uganda performed cleansing rituals of stepping on eggs and jumping over branches of *Olwedo* shrubs as a means of spiritually cleansing the fighters. These rituals encouraged acceptance of combatants by the

⁴⁸ Paul Omach, “The Limits of Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration,” in *Peacebuilding, Power, and Politics in Africa*, ed. Devon Curtis, and Gwinyayi A. Dzinesa, and Adekeye Adebajo (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2012), 93, <https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/>.

population and helped facilitate psychological reintegration.⁴⁹ Informal demobilization programs like these are integral to creating forgiveness and acceptance among members of communities and building lasting peace. However, such activities are rarely captured by standard tools for evaluating DDR programs.

Jonah Schulhofer-Wohl and Nicholas Sambanis argue that the reduction of violence and crime in postwar societies is the measurable outcome that ultimately proves the success of DDR programs in recovering states. The reduction of violence should be measured by several factors, including the number of guns in circulation, the level of noncriminal economic activity, a decline in civilian violence (as opposed to just combatant violence), and the level of criminal activity seen in the community.⁵⁰ Jonah Leff often gives the examples of Mozambique and Sierra Leone, where combatants ultimately turned in their weapons to DDR centers, communities accepted the fighters, and they were able to live together and resume normal life.⁵¹

From this discussion, this thesis proposes the following long-term measures and indicators for the success of DDR programs. First, communities' positive reception of ex-combatants is a critical measure of success for DDR programs. Internal wars, including insurgency and civil war, often impact multiple communities within a state. This legacy of violence can affect ex-combatants' relationships with local communities and reintegration. Therefore, a successful DDR program needs to consist of culturally acceptable ways of reintegrating ex-combatants back into communities that will result in acceptance and peace.

Second, the acceptance of law and order by both ex-combatants and the general population is another long-term measure of success of an effective DDR program. As described in the previous section, the creation of law and effective police and judicial institutions to enforce the law is important for creating a viable state. Similarly, DDR

⁴⁹ Omach, "The Limits of Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration," 95.

⁵⁰ Jonah Schulhofer-Wohl and Nicholas Sambanis, "Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Programs, An Assessment," accessed July 12, 2016, 10–11, http://www.faculty.virginia.edu/j.sw/uploads/research/Disarmament,%20Demobilization,%20Reintegration%20Programs_%20An%20Assessment.pdf.

⁵¹ Leff, "The Nexus between Social Capital and Reintegration of Ex-combatants," 27.

programs cannot succeed unless ex-combatants and the general population recognize the rule of law and accept it as the only legitimate source of justice. Benchmarks that show progress towards this long-term measure of success include a reduced level of reprisals between the population and ex-combatants, an increased number of civil cases involving ex-combatants being brought before courts; and reduced violence against government forces. As the UN expresses it, the task of DDR is to support a peace-building procedure, and to assist warring factions to plan, implement, and consolidate the setting for the achievement of a peace agreement, but the success of the program largely depends on the link between the security service and judicial system.⁵² The symbiotic relationship between the two facilitates the prosperity of the nation.

Third, the presence and status of refugees is another important measure of success in a DDR program. The presence of refugees in neighboring states, particularly along the border, can be both a reflection of violent instability, and a cause of it. First, internal conflicts, such as insurgencies and civil wars, often create forced migration that result in refugees who cross borders, and internally displaced persons (IDP) who move but remain within a state's borders. While tracking and measuring IDPs can be difficult because it requires monitoring activities inside a conflict state, tracking and counting refugees is often easier and receives attention from international bodies like the United Nations.

The placement of refugee camps near borders of conflict-ridden states allows refugees to mass near their home country, potentially increasing the chances of their return after the conflict has subsided. However, these refugees can become a target for warring groups, particularly if the refugee camp holds opposing forces. Refugee camps can also provide a place for combatants to hide amongst the population, allowing them to rest, receive nourishment, and regroup. James Milner, for example, stresses that the establishment of refugee camps or settlements away from the border areas reduces tensions between neighboring states. In particular, creating camps some distance away from factions or ethnic groups engaged in the fighting may reduce the chance of attacks

⁵² “UNDDR 2.10: The UN Approach to DDR; Level 2 Concepts, Policy, and Strategy of the IDDRS,” United Nations Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (UN 2006), <http://unddr.org/uploads/documents/IDDRS%202.10%20The%20UN%20Approach%20to%20DDR.pdf>.

being carried out from inside the country hosting the refugees.⁵³ A UNDP report says, for example, that war leads to both combatants and civilians crossing borders; however, the security threat is high in the bordering states when fighters cross the border and are granted refugee status. It is important to identify, disarm, and separate combatants from the refugee population to deter attacks in refugee temporary shelters or prevent recruitment of youth and able-bodied males and females into rebel groups.⁵⁴

For instance, consider the presence of pro-Gbagbo fighters on Liberian soil. Armed attacks from Liberia into Ivory Coast caused the deaths of civilians and United Nations peacekeepers.⁵⁵ Under these conditions, the population and groups that supported them retained their weapons for self-protection, which undermined the success of Ivory Coast's DDR program. Christina Solomon and Jeremy Ginifer argue, therefore, that the reduction of cross-border combatants and small weapons trafficking from neighboring countries is another measure of success of DDR programs.⁵⁶ In other words, the very movement of foreign combatants from a conflict state to a non-conflict state could destabilize communities living in the border areas. Solomon and Ginifer also explain that, though the DDR program in Sierra Leone officially closed in January 2002, the country is continuing to experience armed crime and violence on the border with Liberia, along with overall increases in insecurity and the risk of an influx of small arms into border communities.⁵⁷ Overall, the persistence of violence in border areas

⁵³ James Milner, "The Militarization and Demilitarization of Refugee Camps in Guinea," accessed September 15, 2016, <http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/D-Book-series/book-01-Armed-and-Aimless/SAS-Armed-Aimless-Part-1-Chapter-05.pdf>.

⁵⁴ "'Cross-border Population Movements' Level 5 Cross-cutting Issues," United Nations Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration, accessed July 8, 2016, <http://unddr.org/uploads/documents/IDDRS%205.40%20Cross-border%20Population%20Movements.pdf>.

⁵⁵ "Peace and Security along the Ivorian-Liberian Border: The Local Perspective," Conciliation Resources, accessed July 17, 2016, <http://www.c-r.org/downloads/755%20CR%20MRR%20Liberia%20report%20ENG%20Draft%2010%20-%20lo-res.pdf>.

⁵⁶ Christina Solomon and Jeremy Ginifer, "Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration in Sierra Leone," *DDR and Human Security: Post-conflict Security-building in the Interests of the Poor*, Centre for International Cooperation and Security (University of Bradford, July 2008): 29. http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/4024~v~Disarmament_Demobilisation_and_Reintegration_in_Sierra_Leone.pdf.

⁵⁷ Solomon and Ginifer, "Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration in Sierra Leone," 27.

undermines DDR programs and increases the likelihood of fighting between border communities.

Finally, the return of former soldiers to lawful employment, and the overall improvement of local economies, is an important measure of success in DDR programs. Solomon and Ginifer describe, for example, that the Sierra Leonean DDR program managed to train former soldiers and empower them with technical skills for automobile repair, metalwork, furniture work, and construction. After completing the training, trainees received tools, kits, and assistance in seeking jobs in public works and development projects.⁵⁸ Employment opportunities reduced the level of violence and helped return the country to normal. Conversely, a lack of employment opportunities has hindered the success of DDR programs elsewhere. Lilli Banholzer, for example, argues that to disarm ex-combatants implies the end of their employment as fighters and loss of income. Failure to find job or income-generating activity will most likely lead ex-combatants to take up arms again, including joining rebel groups in other countries, as well as engaging in criminal activities or illicit trade. An example of this is the number of South African ex-soldiers who became mercenaries in violent conflicts in Angola and the DRC.⁵⁹

However, as argued in the previous section, it is also important to create incentives for society as a whole, and not only to favor ex-combatants. No program, however, is possible without an overall improvement in a country's economy. Therefore, the benchmarks for employment that this thesis will use include a country's per capita gross domestic product (GDP), diversity of economy, poverty index, and international trade.

In sum, this thesis will ask the following questions regarding measures of effectiveness (MOE) to analyze the DRC's DDR program:

1. Community reintegration
 - a. Is there violence between the community and the ex-combatants?

⁵⁸ Ibid., 15.

⁵⁹ Banholzer, "When Do Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programmes Succeed?" 4–5.

- b. Did the community create a ritual or cultural practice to reintroduce the ex-combatants to society?
- 2. Acceptance of law and order
 - a. What is the level of crime in the community?
 - b. What are the levels of violent crime?
- 3. Status of refugees
 - a. What is the number of refugees in neighboring countries, particularly along the borders?
 - b. What is the number of refugees being voluntarily repatriated?
- 4. Economic prosperity
 - a. What is the level of development in the country? What are the main legitimate economies? Are they growing?
 - b. What is the per capita GDP?

E. CONCLUSION

The creation of a comprehensive and lasting DDR program requires not just disarming ex-combatants and returning them to their homes, but also rebuilding a state's rule of law, delivering security that the population perceives as legitimate and fair, and creating economic opportunity and good relationships with neighboring countries. Good governance, in other words, is necessary for successful DDR programs and helps accelerate the building of trust and confidence among all parties and sectors of society. Furthermore, programs that allow ex-combatants and the population to work together in economic activities help stabilize society. By contrast, the absence or lack of collaboration may result in the ex-soldiers rearming and returning to combat for their survival.

The next chapter uses the three variables of reintegration identified here—security, law, and justice; economic opportunity; and good relations with neighboring countries, as well as their corresponding measures of effectiveness—to evaluate the DDR program initiated in the DRC from November 2004 to September 2009, to better understand what led to their failure.

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III. THE CONGOLESE WAR AND DDR PROGRAM

A. BACKGROUND

In July 1999, several warring factions in the Democratic Republic of Congo signed the Lusaka ceasefire agreement with the intention of ending the years-long Congolese wars.⁶⁰ A key component of the peace accords was a DDR program that aimed to disarm and return legally and illegally armed fighters to civilian life. The DDR program also included an UN-led mission, the *Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies au Congo*, (MONUC) aimed to disarm and repatriate external forces from the DRC, including soldiers from Rwanda, Hutu militias, and Interehamwe, to their country of origin. Despite the official consensus on ending the war in the country, violence continued.⁶¹

On December 17, 2002, key parties signed another accord, the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement in Pretoria, South Africa, with the goal of restructuring and integrating the Congolese national army to strengthen stability and security in the country.⁶² The new Army *Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo* (FARDC) replaced the old Army *Forces Armees Congolaises* (FAC) with the overall aim of incorporating all combatants into the national army. A key component of this restructuring included the voluntary demobilization, retraining, and redeployment of legally and illegally armed individuals.⁶³ Despite all of these efforts to establish peace in the DRC and use DDR programs to end violence, instability and war have persisted.

The purpose of this chapter is to describe the conditions that led to the first and second Congolese wars and to provide an overview of the DDR programs initiated to

⁶⁰ Eirin Mobekk, "MONUC: DDRRR, DDR, Military and Rule of Law Reform—Reducing Violence against Women," actionaid, 2006, <http://www.eldis.org/go/home&id=22529&type=Document#.V7CuEf76uP8>.

⁶¹ "DDR in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Program Update," World Bank, September 2009, http://tdrp.net/mdrp/PDFs/DRC_Program_Update.pdf.

⁶² Henri Boshoff, "Overview of Security Sector Reform Processes in the DRC," *African Security Studies* 13, no. 4 (2004): 62, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10246029.2004.9627319>.

⁶³ "DDR in the Democratic Republic of Congo," 1–2.

create lasting peace in the country. The chapter is divided into four sections. The first section describes the conditions that led to the first and second Congolese wars. The second section briefly describes the main rebel groups, ethnic militias, and government forces fighting in the DRC. The third section outlines the three phases of the DDR program and describes the actors that contributed to and supervised the implementation of the program. And, the fourth section offers concluding thoughts.

B. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF DRC CONFLICT

The DRC gained independence on June 30, 1960, from Belgium.⁶⁴ In November 24, 1965, Joseph Mobutu overthrew the newly formed independent government through a military coup, took power as president, and led the central government and the army. Mobutu published a new constitution in March 1967 that stipulated a single chamber parliament, one political party, a judiciary, and provincial governors. National service, specifically military service, was compulsory under the new constitution.⁶⁵ Mobutu further renamed the nation Zaire instead of Congo.⁶⁶ Later on, Mobutu changed his name from Joseph-Desire Mobutu to Mobutu Sese Seko Kuku Ngbendu wa Za Banga (“The all-powerful warrior who goes from conquest to conquest, leaving fire in his wake”).⁶⁷ Over the course of his years in power, he successfully destroyed state institutions, which allowed him to stay in power and eliminate political opposition. Moreover, political interference and corruption eroded the justice system, government bureaucracy, and security services. In addition to undermining the state, Mobutu’s administration depended on Cold War allies and mercenaries to suppress military challenges. With the end of the Cold War, many of these resources dried up, presenting challenges to his leadership and to stability in the country.⁶⁸

⁶⁴ Michela Wrong, *In the Footsteps of Mr. Kurtz: Living on the Brink of Disaster in the Congo*, (London: Fourth Estate, 2000), 67.

⁶⁵ Haskin, *The Tragic State of the Congo*, 41–42.

⁶⁶ Jason Stearns, *Dancing in the Glory of Monsters: The Collapse of the Congo and the Great War of Africa* (New York: Public Affairs, 2012), 7.

⁶⁷ Wrong, *In the Footsteps of Mr. Kurtz*, 4.

⁶⁸ Stearns, *Dancing in the Glory of Monsters*, 7.

Alongside the destructive policies of the Mobutu regime, conflicts in neighboring countries greatly affected Congo's stability. In 1994, the Rwanda genocide caused a mass exodus of refugees to the neighboring countries of Burundi, Zaire, Congo and Tanzania. UNHCR and nongovernmental organizations opened refugee camps just across Rwanda's borders in neighboring countries to provide humanitarian assistance to the war victims. The focal locations for the camps in the Congo soil were Katale, Kahindo, Mugunga, Lac Vert, and Sake in Goma in North Kivu Province. The camps quickly became infiltrated with ex-FAR soldiers (Forces Armées Rwandaises - Hutu ethnic from Rwanda), and politicians, migrating under the protection of refugee status. These infiltrators compelled refugees to provide them with food rations and medical supplies. They rewarded those who complied and punished those who were loyal to humanitarian aid workers.⁶⁹ President Mobutu helped ex-FAR leaders by broadcasting anti-Tutsi messages and supplying weapons, particularly in Kivu.⁷⁰ In October 1994, ex-FAR forces crossed into the DRC and killed 36 people near Gisenyi. The main targets were Tutsi, but some Hutu civilians were victimized as a means of intimidation and to compel their support.⁷¹

In October 1995, war broke out in Kivu, forcing Congolese Tutsi, ex-FAR, and Interahamwe to flee to Rwanda. The following year, the Mobutu administration sent the Vangu Commission (a DRC parliament committee) to Kivu to identify members of the Zairian population and to declare all non-Zairians, including Tutsi and Banyamulenge, to be refugees. Between March and May 1996, the government launched a forced repatriation campaign against Tutsi refugees in Rutshuru and Masisi in North Kivu.⁷² This ethnic repatriation program sparked animosity between the Rwandan and Mobutu governments. Ethnic Hutus used this opportunity to conduct offensive attacks and raids against ethnic Tutsi in the area, resulting in the escalation of conflict in the DRC. Burundi and Rwanda accused the Zairian government of supporting rebel groups to destabilize

⁶⁹ Gérard Prunier, *Africa's World War: Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a Continental Catastrophe* (Oxford University Press, 2008), 24–26.

⁷⁰ Ibid., 56.

⁷¹ Ibid., 26.

⁷² "Who Belongs Where? Conflict, Displacement, Land and Identity in North Kivu, Democratic Republic of Congo," International Refugee Rights Initiative, March 2010, <http://www.refugee-rights.org/Publications/Papers/2010/Who%20Belongs%20Where.EN.March2010.pdf>.

their countries. Mobutu's policy ultimately motivated Laurent Kabila, the leader of the exiled Congolese revolutionary party, to join forces with Banyamulenge-Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) rebels to overthrow Mobutu. Bad relations between these countries further generated hostilities in the Great Lakes region.

According to Gerard Prunier, the first war in the DRC broke out in September 1996. The Banyamulenge/RPA rebels with support from the Rwandan Army, in collaboration with a Congolese opposition movement under the leadership of Joseph Desire Kabila, attacked Zaire with the intention of overthrowing Mobutu and ending his support to various rebels groups and Hutu militia in the border areas. A joint Congolese rebel political movement was formed in North Kivu on October 18, 1996, under the name *Alliance des Forces Democratiques pour la Liberation du Congo-Zaire* (AFDL). On November 15, refugees began crossing the border from Zaire to Rwanda to flee the war.⁷³

The RPA-Banyamulenge rebels (Congolese of Rwandan ancestry living in South Kivu—literally people from Mulenge) who had been in conflict with Mobutu's government and supported by the Rwandan Patriotic Forces (RPF), started attacking the Hutu refugee camps in eastern DRC (then Zaire) in September 1, 1996, dispersing refugees in Bukavu and South Kivu.⁷⁴ To protect the Congolese, the local Congolese authorities collaborated with Babembe and Barega armed groups to kill and loot in the Banyamulenge community.⁷⁵ The RPF provided training and logistical support to these Banyamulenge forces to help them eliminate Hutu rebel bases in Kivu.⁷⁶ Mobutu's policy ultimately motivated Laurent Kabila, the leader of the exiled Congolese revolutionary party, to join forces with the Banyamuleng to overthrow Mobutu. Kabila, AFDL/RPA forces, and allies from Rwanda and Uganda successfully overthrew the Mobutu regime in May 1997; they changed the name of the country from Zaire to the Democratic Republic

⁷³ Prunier, *Africa's World War*, 113–120.

⁷⁴ Stearns, *Dancing in the Glory of Monsters*, 60; Prunier, *Africa's World War*, 69–70.

⁷⁵ Prunier, *Africa's World War*, 70.

⁷⁶ Kevin C. Dunn, "A Survival Guide to Kinshasa, Lessons of the Father, Passed Down to the Son," in *the African Stakes of the Congo War*, ed. John F Clack (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 56–57, <http://site.elibrary.com/lib/nps/Top?id=10135660>.

of Congo and the name of the national army to the *Forces Armees Congolaises* (FAC).⁷⁷ This was the first Congolese war and it lasted from September 1996 until May 1997.

The second Congolese war broke out on August 3, 1998, and involved rebel forces from Kivu province supported by Rwanda and Uganda fighting FAC backed by Angola, Namibia, Chad, Sudan, and Zimbabwe.⁷⁸ In July 1998, just after a year in office, Kabila dismissed Colonel James Kabarebe, who had Rwandan origins but commanded the Congolese army, and expelled all Rwandan forces and ordered them to depart from the DRC.⁷⁹ Kabila's opponents from the east of the DRC created a new rebel group called *Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie* (RCD), with intention of removing him from power after the removal of Rwandans.⁸⁰

The eviction of Rwandans from the government, which in turn caused the mutiny of soldiers of Rwandan descent in the Kivu, Bukavu, Goma, Baraka, Kindu, Kisangani and Kinshasa regions of Congo, triggered further hostilities in the DRC. The second Congolese war started when the RPA, under the command of James Kabarebe, moved to the border to support anti-Kabila rebels in Kivu province. Commander Kabarebe landed at Kitona on August 4, via hijacked planes, to organize the rebellion in eastern DRC. Kabarebe and his forces killed several Congolese officers in Kavumu camp who were loyal to the Kabila administration.⁸¹ Following these events, war escalated in the eastern section of the country. The official war lasted one year, and then was followed by a series of peace accords, including DDR programs aimed at creating lasting peace, which is further described in Section D of this chapter.

Scholars offer several hypotheses for the causes of the first and second Congolese wars. Rouw and Rens, for example, argue that North and South Kivu were the locations where the Congolese war truly started. According to them, land disputes between ethnic groups in these areas and the weakness of the government in solving these disputes,

⁷⁷ Prunier, *Africa's World War*, 113–149; Haskin, *Tragic State of the Congo*, 82–83.

⁷⁸ Prunier, *Africa's World War*, 187–198.

⁷⁹ Stearns, *Dancing in the Glory of Monsters*, 183.

⁸⁰ Prunier, *Africa's World War*, 183–184.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 181–182.

particularly in the populated areas, were the major causes of the conflict.⁸² Specifically, Congolese Tutsi occupied more land than did indigenous Congolese, resulting in an ethnically based dispute that generated hatred towards the Congolese Tutsi, particularly in the eastern parts of the DRC.⁸³

Another cause of the Congolese wars was conflicts in neighboring countries. The influx of refugees, ex-FAR, and Interahamwe after the 1994 Rwanda genocide on the border with Rwanda and Uganda proved another source of increased ethnic conflict among the population.⁸⁴ Severine Autesserre argues that refugees began to compete with Congolese citizens over land ownership in the border areas, which led to intensified disputes over land and resources, triggering violence between Congolese Hutu/Tutsi populations and Rwanda Hutu/Tutsi already in the DRC. The tensions between older populations of Rwandans in the DRC and newly arriving refugees further fueled the fighting. These clashes ultimately produced a complex network of armed groups and militias, each with the goal of defending Congolese land and resources from refugees and non-native Congolese.⁸⁵

Yet another argument for the cause of the wars in the DRC focuses on Mobutu's relationship with Rwandan forces. Prunier, for example, stresses that, the immediate cause of the first war was the support Mobutu gave to Rwandan Hutu (ex- FAR and Interahamwe) against Congolese Tutsi (Banyamulege). In May 1996, the Mobutu regime supported ex-FAR leaders by buying weapons and providing camps for training and recruiting soldiers. Ultimately, these resources provided the opportunity for these forces to conduct a series of attacks and raids over the border against the RPF, with the goal of recapturing Rwanda.⁸⁶

⁸² Willems and Hans, "Connecting Community Security and DDR," 5.

⁸³ Séverine Autesserre, *The Trouble with the Congo: Local Violence and the Failure of International Peacebuilding* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 135.

⁸⁴ Willems and Hans, "Connecting Community Security and DDR," 5.

⁸⁵ Autesserre, *The Trouble with the Congo*, 141.

⁸⁶ Prunier, *Africa's World War*, 26–27.

Regardless of the different hypotheses for the causes of the wars, both conflicts militarized large segments of the population, weakened DRC's economy, and badly damaged its political and physical infrastructure. In order to better understand the conditions that have inhibited the end of conflict in DRC, and the failed DDR programs in particular, it is first necessary to summarize the main fighting groups in the country.

C. MAJOR REBEL GROUPS, ETHNIC MILITIAS, AND GOVERNMENT FORCES

Perhaps one of the greatest obstacles to lasting peace in the DRC is the sheer number of different fighting groups in the conflict. This section provides a brief overview of the different rebel groups, their leaders, and splinter groups; ethnic militias that have emerged primarily as defense forces; and different government forces fighting in the first and second Congolese wars.

1. Rebel Groups

The conflict in the DRC involved various Congolese rebel fighters and rebel fighters from neighboring countries that complicated the peace and caused the escalation of hostilities between communities in the country. This section discusses armed groups from the DRC and neighboring countries that operated and participated during the Congolese war.

a. Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD)—DRC

The RCD was a rebel group created on August 16, 1998, to topple President Kabila. RCD was supported by Burundi, Uganda, and Rwanda. Wamba dia Wamba was the president of the RCD, and Jean-Pierre Ondekane was its military leader.⁸⁷ In May 1999, the group split into two factions: RCD-G (RCD-Goma) with support from Rwanda; and RCD-K (RCD-Kisangani), which was backed by Uganda.⁸⁸ In November 1999, RCD-G split and created a new faction named RCD-ML (RCD-Mouvement de Liberation) under the leadership of Wamba dia Wamba. In late November 1999, Roger

⁸⁷ Prunier, *Africa's World War*, 183.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 221–222.

Lumbala a prominent leader of RCD-G formed his own group named RCD-N (RCD-National).⁸⁹ On January 16, 2001, the RCD-ML, RCD/N, and Movement for the Liberation of Congo merged to form the *Front de Liberation du Congo* (FLC) and became a political party during the transition period.⁹⁰

b. Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC)—DRC

The MLC was a group of rebel fighters founded by Jean-Pierre Bemba, the son of former President Mobutu. On November 7, 1998, following the overthrow of the Mobutu regime, the MLC officially became an armed rebel group backed by Uganda. The MLC-UPDF (Uganda People's Defense Force) has been active in Equateur province with the intention of capturing Kisangani.⁹¹

In 2002 to 2003, Jeanne-Pierre Bemba, as the president of the MLC, collaborated with his militia group to commit crimes and violence against the civilians in the Central African Republic. Because of that allegation the International Criminal Court of justice issued an arrest warrant; in 2008 Bemba was arrested, convicted and put in jail. That led to leadership difficulties that caused the group to break away. Jose Makila Sumanda, the governor of Equateur, defected from the MLC and formed a new party known as the Labour Alliance for Development on May 5, 2011. In addition, former MLC secretary general Francois Muamba formed a new opposition party called the Alliance for Development and the Republic on July 11, 2011.⁹²

c. Nationalist Integrationist Front (FNI)—DRC

The FNI was founded by Floribert Ndjabu Ngabu and Etienne Lona in Ituri, and is comprised primarily of the Lendu, an ethnic group. The FNI has fought the Hema tribe

⁸⁹ Ibid., 228–229.

⁹⁰ Roberto Garreton, "Report for the International Criminal Court (ICC 01/04-01/06-1655-Anx-tENG), Mandate of the special report on human rights in Zaire, (February 20, 2009), 14, https://www.icc-cpi.int/RelatedRecords/CR2009_01289.PDF.

⁹¹ Prunier, *Africa's World War*, 204–205.

⁹² "Movement for the Liberation of Congo (Mouvement de Liberation du Congo, (MLC), Including Leadership and Treatment of Party Members (2009-2012)," refworld: Democratic Republic of Congo, March 16, 2012, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/4f9e58782.html>.

in Ituri and was blamed for the killing of UN peacekeepers in the area. FNI has received support from Uganda.⁹³ The FNI has prolonged the conflict in eastern DRC contrary to the peace agreement signed in April 2003, which involved all rebels, militias, and political parties. The March 2005 arrest of Etienne Lona, a key leader, caused the group's disintegration. The FNI became a political party known as the National Congolese Party in August 2005, following former combatants' participation in a DDR program in Ituri province (DCR). At that time, that group ended its relationship with Lendu combatants and ceased to be an armed group.⁹⁴

d. *Union of Congolese Patriots (Union des Patriots Congolais, UPC)—DRC*

The UPC operated in Ituri with the goal of protecting the interests of the Hema ethnic group. Rwanda sponsored that ethnic group to conduct violence and criminal activities against civilians. In 2003, the group fragmented to form UPC-K, under the leadership of Kisembo Bahemuka, and the Union of Congolese Patriots, headed by Thomas Lubanga and Commander Bosco Taganda, who have been accused of human rights abuses.⁹⁵ In 2005, UPC leader Thomas Lubanga was arrested on charges of sending and recruiting children under the age of 15 to the battlefield. On July 10, 2012, he was sentenced to 14 years in prison.⁹⁶ The arrest of group members in April 2005 triggered his followers to end the atrocities and stop fighting.⁹⁷

e. *Lord's Resistance Army (LRA)—Uganda*

The LRA was formed in the mid-1980s by the opponents of the Ugandan government. Joseph Kony is the leader of the group. From the 1980s to early 2000s, the

⁹³ "Who's Who in Ituri—Militia Organisations Leaders," IRIN-News, accessed July 30, 2016, <http://www.irinnews.org/report/53981/drc-whos-who-ituri-militia-organisations-leaders>.

⁹⁴ Henning Tamm, "FNI and FRPI, Local Resistance and Regional Alliances in North-eastern Congo," *Rift Valley Institute* (2013): 34, RVI Usalama Project 7 FNI & FRPI.pdf—Rift Valley Institute.

⁹⁵ "Background: Enriching the Elites," Human Rights Watch, accessed August 2, 2016, <https://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/drc0505/6.htm>.

⁹⁶ "Union of Patriotic Congolese (UPC)," GlobalSecurity.org, accessed October 17, 2016, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/upc.htm>.

⁹⁷ "Armed Conflict Report—Democratic Republic of Congo," Justice.gov, last modified January 2009, <https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2014/02/25/Congo.pdf>.

rebel group operated in northern Uganda and southern Sudan. The group received assistance from Sudan such as military equipment and supplies to wage war. In 2005, the LRA moved to the DRC and the Central African Republic (CAR) after South Sudan gained its independence.⁹⁸ That rebel group was responsible for kidnapping, torturing, committing massacres, engaging in the sex-slave trade, and enslaving children as soldiers, which is contrary to human rights law. It is still active and is mostly thought to be located in the CAR. In March 2016, the Security Council committee listed the LRA as “engaging in or providing support for acts that undermine the peace, stability or security of the CAR.”⁹⁹

f. Allied Democratic Forces (ADF)—Uganda

This religious-based group originated from the Ruwenzori mountain area of western Uganda and operates in Uganda and eastern DRC with the aim of establishing Sharia law in their country of origin. Jamil Mukulu created that group in the late 1990s. The rebel group was involved in criminal activities such as killings, beheadings, rapes, kidnappings, and enslavement of children as soldiers in Uganda and the DRC.¹⁰⁰ According to a Global Security think tank report, the ADF is still active and responsible for numerous attacks on civilians in the DRC. On August 13, 2016, the ADF attacked civilians in the Beni region and killed 50 people.¹⁰¹ The major armed groups fighting during the second Congolese war are summarized in Table 1.

⁹⁸ Ted Dagne, *The Democratic Republic of Congo: Background and Current Development Current Politics and Economics of Africa* (CRS Report No. R40108) (Washington, DC: Congressional Service Report, 2012), 97, <https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40108.pdf>.

⁹⁹ “Lord’s Resistance Army,” United Nations Security Council Subsidiary Organ, Resolution 2127, March 7, 2016, <https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/2127/materials/summaries/entity/lord%E2%80%99s-resistance-army>.

¹⁰⁰ “Allied Democratic Forces, National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (NALU), Armee Nationale De Liberation De L’Ouganda Forces Democratiques Alliees, Islamic Alliance Of Democratic Forces,” GlobalSecurity.org, accessed July 31, 2016, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/adf.htm>.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

Table 1. Summary of major armed groups

Group	Leader	Aligned Country	Objective
RCD	Wamba dia Wamba	Rwanda	Remove President Laurent Kabila
RDC–N	Roger Lumbala	Uganda	Remove President Laurent Kabila
MLC	Jean-Pierre Bemba	Uganda	Remove President Laurent Kabila
RCD-K	Mbusa Nyamisi	Rwanda	Remove President Laurent Kabila
FNI	Floribert Ndjabu Ngabu & Etienne Lona	DRC	Protect the interest of Lendu ethnic group
UPC	Kisembo Bahemuka	Uganda	Protect the interest of Hema ethnic group
LRA	Joseph Kony	DRC	Remove President Museveni and establish state based on Kony's interpretation of the Bible's Ten Commandments
ADF	Jamil Mukulu	DRC	Establish Sharia law in Uganda

2. Ethnic Militias in Ituri

In addition to the groups mentioned earlier in this section, the DRC also has ethnic and tribal groups that have participated in the conflict in the form of militias or other loosely organized groups, specifically the Mayi Mayi, Interahamwe, Burundi rebels, and ethnic militia groups in Ituri and the Kivu, and Banyamulenge.

a. Mayi Militias—DRC

Mayi–Mayi or Mai-Mais are self-defense militia groups found in the eastern part of the DRC; they were formed to protect their communities from rebel groups and government forces. During the war, these militias stayed loyal to the Congolese government and supported the government in its fight against the Rwandan army.¹⁰²

b. Ex-FAR and Interahamwe

After the Rwanda massacre in 1994, Hutus fled to the DRC and became another source of support for the DRC government forces during the war. These forces had a

¹⁰² Prunier, *Africa's World War*, 210–211.

falling out with the Kabila administration. However, during the second Congolese war, they came back from Brazzaville, Gabon, and Sudan to support the Kabila regime when it was under Rwandan attack.¹⁰³

c. *Banyamulenge (Congolese Tutsi of Rwandan Descent)*

Tutsi lived in the DRC prior to colonialism; however, greater numbers migrated there in the early 1920s as laborers on the plantations, followed by additional waves in the 1960s and 1970s as Tutsis fled massacres by the new Hutu government in Rwanda. As described in Section B, Congolese tribes accused the Tutsis of taking their land, fueling animosity and resentment in the regions in which they settled, and ultimately spurring the large-scale massacre of those perceived to be Rwandan Tutsis in North and South Kivu.¹⁰⁴ During the second Congolese war, Banyamulenge residents of the DRC collaborated with Rwandan and Ugandan forces to remove Kabila from power.

d. *The Forces for Defense of Democracy (FDD)—Burundi*

Ethnic Tutsis dominate the Pierre Buyoya regime in Burundi, fueling animosity among ethnic Burundians, most of whom are Hutus. This dynamic led to Burundian Hutus joining forces with ethnic Hutus from the DRC to fight the Tutsi-dominated government in Burundi, eventually creating the FDD, which is located near the Burundian border in eastern Congo.¹⁰⁵ The presence of the FDD and the instability it has caused has prompted Burundian government forces to go on the offensive in the DRC with the goal of eliminating Burundi rebel bases and protecting its borders.¹⁰⁶ Table 2 summarizes the ethnic groups involved in the second Congo War.

¹⁰³ Ibid., 204–210.

¹⁰⁴ Autesserre, *The Trouble with the Congo*, 57.

¹⁰⁵ Christopher Williams, “Explaining the Great Ear in Africa: How Conflict in the Congo Became a Continental Crisis,” *Fletcher Forum* 37 no. 2 (2013): 93, <http://www.fletcherforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Williams-37-2.pdf>; Willy Nindorera, “The CNDD-FDD in Burundi: The Path from Armed to Political Struggle,” accessed August 17, 2016, http://www.berghof-foundation.org/fileadmin/redaktion/Publications/Papers/Transitions_Series/transitions10_burundi.pdf.

¹⁰⁶ Williams, “Explaining the Great Ear in Africa,” 93.

Table 2. Summary of major ethnic groups in the DRC war

Ethnic Group	Aligned Country	Objective
Mayi–Mayi militias	DRC	Protect ancestral land and resources
Ex-FAR and Interahamwe (Hutu armed forces)	DRC	Eliminate Congolese Tutsi and remove President Paul Kagame
Banyamulenge (Congolese Tutsi)	Rwanda	Eliminate Congolese Hutu and remove President Laurent Kabila
FDD (Burundians Hutu)	Anti-Burundi	Remove the Tutsi government in Burundi

3. Government Security Forces

In addition to insurgent groups and ethnic militias, several countries' government forces were also active in the DRC: specifically, the Rwandan Patriotic Army, Uganda Peoples' Defense Forces, and the Burundi army. Each of these armies had different motives and goals for engaging in the Congolese conflict. The main goal for Rwanda and Uganda was to overthrow the Kabila regime. Burundi's main objective was to eliminate bases of Hutu rebels.

During the second Congolese war, Kabila's army, the FAC, was too weak to launch offensive actions and unable to successfully compel Burundian, Rwandan, and Ugandan forces to withdraw. This dynamic prompted forces from Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Sudan, and Chad to enter the war to support Kabila to retain his power.¹⁰⁷ The major government forces fighting in the second war are summarized in Table 3.

¹⁰⁷ Prunier, *Africa's World War*, 183–198.

Table 3. Summary of the major government forces

Country	Leader	Forces	Objective
Angola	President Jose Eduardo dos Santos	Angolan Army	Assist President Laurent Kabila to remain in power
Burundi	President Pierre Buyoya	Burundi Forces	Destroy Hutu base in DRC
DRC	President Joseph Kabila	FAC	Hold power
Namibia	President Sam Nujoma	Namibian Defense Force	Assist President Laurent Kabila to remain in power
Rwanda	President Paul Kagame	RPF	Remove President Laurent Kabila from office
Uganda	President Yoweri Museveni	UPDF	Remove President Laurent Kabila from office
Zimbabwe	President Robert Mugabe	ZNA	Assist President Laurent Kabila to remain in power

As will be discussed next, the rebel groups, militias, and government forces all required some form of DDR program to reduce violence and end the conflict in DRC. However, the sheer number of factions engaged in the fighting and individuals militarized as a result of these wars presented considerable challenges for the DRC government, neighboring countries, and the international community as many sought to effectively demobilize or transition these factions and militias into lawfully armed forces.

D. PEACE ACCORDS AND DDR PROGRAMS IN THE DRC

The DRC, neighboring countries, and some rebel groups signed a series of peace accords aimed at ending the second war in Congo. The first of these, the Lusaka ceasefire agreement signed in July 1999, involved leaders from Angola, the DRC, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe, as well as the MLC and RCD rebel groups in August 1999.¹⁰⁸ The agreement, which was validated through UN resolution 1927, sketched the peace process by stipulating the deployment of the MONUC peacekeepers and the removal of all external forces in the DRC.¹⁰⁹ The agreement also laid the initial

¹⁰⁸ Mobekk, "MONUC: DDRRR, DDR, Military and Rule of Law Reform—Reducing Violence against Women," 6.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., 6.

framework for a national DDR program, including political dialogue amid the government of DRC and rebel fighters to settle their differences through peaceful means.¹¹⁰ Before the achievement of a final peace deal, however, President Laurent Kabila was killed, paving the way for Kabila's son, Joseph Kabila, to become the head of state.¹¹¹ Hostilities continued in the eastern part of the country despite the pull out of external forces.¹¹²

In July 2002, a second round of peace talks was held in Pretoria, South Africa, which involved the DRC government and Rwanda. This peace accord convened the Congolese army to track down, disarm, dismantle, and repatriate ex-FAR and Interahamwe. The peace accord also required the Rwandan People's Army to withdraw from DRC.¹¹³ To reinforce the pull-out of Rwandan forces, the Congolese government called for the political leader of the *Forces Democratiques des Liberation du Rwanda* (FDLR) to leave the country on September 24, 2002.¹¹⁴ Meanwhile, the DRC and Uganda signed a separate peace agreement on Sept 6, 2002, in Luanda, Angola, which called for the withdrawal of the Ugandan military from the soil of the DRC.¹¹⁵ Despite both of these accords, the Congolese government accepted the prolonged presence of a UPDF battalion in the border region of Bunia and on the slopes of Mount Rwenzori to help dismantle the ADF.¹¹⁶

Yet another set of accords, the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement Peace Accords, involving the DRC regime, rebel fighters, militias groups, and opposition parties, was signed on December 12, 2002. The signatories included President Joseph Kabila as the leader of the FAC, and the leaders of the RCD, RCD-K/ML, RCD-N, MLC,

¹¹⁰ Ibid., 8.

¹¹¹ Dagne, "The Democratic Republic of Congo," 90.

¹¹² Mobekk, "MONUC: DDRRR, DDR, Military and Rule of Law Reform–Reducing Violence against Women," 6.

¹¹³ Zoë Marriage, "Flip-flop Rebel, Dollar Soldier: Demobilization in the Democratic Republic of Congo 1: Analysis," *Conflict, Security & Development* 7, no. 2 (2007): 290, doi:10.1080/14678800701333085.

¹¹⁴ "Profile of Internal Displacement: Democratic Republic of Congo," 17.

¹¹⁵ Marriage, "Flip-flop Rebel, Dollar Soldier," 290.

¹¹⁶ "Profile of Internal Displacement: Democratic Republic of Congo," 17.

Mayi-Mayis, active forces, and political opposition. These groups' participation in the talks and agreement to the accords qualified them to participate in a DDR program, which will be described in more detail.¹¹⁷ These accords, signed in Pretoria, adjudicated the creation of a temporary government with four vice presidents and Joseph Kabila as the President; the new leaders were sworn into office in July of 2003.¹¹⁸

Prior to the setting of the new transitional government, the "Final Act," was signed in Sun City on April 2, 2003; this agreement created the framework to restructure and reintegrate various rebel fighters, militias, and government forces into the Congolese countrywide military force (FARDC).¹¹⁹ This accord aimed to bring the various fighting factions in the DRC under government control and also sought to better unify the different regions of the country. The escalation of hostilities in Ituri, however, prompted the need for another round of peace talks in May 2003, held in Dar es Salaam and in Kinshasa in May 2004.¹²⁰

Finally, on September 22, 2004, the governments of Rwanda and the Congo signed an agreement called the Joint Verification Mechanism aimed to address matters on illegal migration and to prevent the relapse of threats from ex-FAR and Interahamwe groups responsible for the Rwandan massacres.¹²¹

A key component of several of these peace accords was the creation of DDR programs designed to end armed conflict in the DRC. The first DDR program, created during the 1999 Lusaka agreement, was headed by the DRC forces in collaboration with MONUC and had the principal aim of repatriating foreign fighters. The DDR program had two distinct goals: one was to target foreign troops, the ex-FAR, Interahamwe, and FDLR, and the other was to promote the repatriation of those fighters to their country.¹²²

¹¹⁷ Marriage, "Flip-flop Rebel, Dollar Soldier," 290.

¹¹⁸ Dagne, "The Democratic Republic of Congo," 91.

¹¹⁹ Boshoff, "Overview of Security Sector Reform Processes in the DRC," 62.

¹²⁰ Marriage, "Flip-flop Rebel, Dollar Soldier," 290.

¹²¹ Dagne, "The Democratic Republic of Congo," 91.

¹²² Mark Malan and Henri Boshoff, "A 90-day Plan to Bring Peace to the DRC?." An Analysis of the Pretoria Agreement of 30 (2002), accessed August 20, 2016, <https://www.issafrica.org/uploads/PAPER61.PDF>.

The overall objective of the DDR(RR) (disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, reintegration, and resettlement) program was to ensure that foreign troops were unable to interrupt the election process or pose a military threat to the DRC.¹²³

Mark Malan and Henri Boshoff outline that the program set 90 days as the timeframe—from July 30, 2002 to October 30, 2002—for the capturing, disarming, dismantling, and repatriating of ex-FAR and Interahamwe, and the pulling out of the Rwandan Patriotic Army.¹²⁴ Zoe Marriage claims that Rwanda withdrew 23,400 troops during this timeframe; however, the DRC administration demanded that 20,000 troops from Rwanda remain under the umbrella of demobilization and community reinsertion in Kivu. On February 21, 2003, a UN report claimed the FDLR were not demobilized at all.¹²⁵ Furthermore, a key objective in this initial program was to disarm foreign fighters, in addition to repatriating them. The same 2003 UN report claimed that the program only disarmed 402 Rwandan Hutus, leaving thousands of other fighters still armed.¹²⁶

The failure of this DDR(RR) program to remove foreign fighters from the DRC prompted the Congolese government to initiate a new accord for the demobilization of foreign troops in October 2004. Marriage reports that the ex-FAR and Interahamwe refused to comply with the agreement until March 31, 2005, and the FDLR would not comply with the agreement at all. Under these circumstances, the government attempted to forcibly disarm and repatriate the FDLR in 2005, but without success.¹²⁷

The Congolese government initiated a second major DDR effort in the DRC in 2004. The government created the National Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration program (PNDDR), which was run by the *Commission Nationale de la Demobilization et Reinsertion* (CONADER) in December 2003. The PNDDR aimed to reestablish security in the country, to initiate security sector reform, and to unite the

¹²³ Mobekk, “MONUC: DDRRR, DDR, Military and Rule of Law Reform–Reducing Violence against Women,” 9.

¹²⁴ Malan and Boshoff, “A 90-day Plan to Bring Peace to the DRC?,” 1–7.

¹²⁵ Marriage, “Flip-flop Rebel, Dollar Soldier,” 294.

¹²⁶ Ibid., 294.

¹²⁷ Ibid., 294.

army. Marriage claims the World Bank's International Development Association released money in April 2004 to run the program and it was subsequently funded by the Multi-donor Reintegration Program in the Great Lakes in May 2004. Other funds came from individual countries, such as Belgium, Canada, Germany, Norway, and the UK, as the financial assistance.¹²⁸ The funds provided USD 200 million to demobilize former soldiers and USD 14 million to reform the military.¹²⁹

The first phase of the national DDR program lasted from October 2004 to December 2006, and provided two options for the ex-combatants, either to be integrated into the *Forces Armees de la Republique Democratique du Congo* (FARDC), DRC's new state military, or to demobilize and re-integrate into society. Those who decided to join security forces moved to *brassage* camps, that integration was run by CONADER in association with several DRC government agencies, including the Structure for Military Integration, the Interministerial Committee for DDR, and the Financial Management Unit. The Congolese government was responsible for security and moral support, while MONUC was in charge of the storage and destruction of weapons.¹³⁰

Boshoff notes that "according to the second draft of national DDR plan dated March 5, 2004, there [were] up to 330,000 combatants in the DRC, of whom 130,000 need[ed] to be mobilized. The plan aim[ed] to limit the future combined DRC defense forces (FARDC) to no more than 130,000 people."¹³¹ According to the National Plan, an adult combatant reporting for a CONADER DDR program received an instant "safety net" imbursement of USD 110, an official demobilization card, and USD 25 per month for 12 months. The program offered vocational training, schooling, and agricultural activities with the intention of providing adult combatants with useful skills.¹³²

¹²⁸ Ibid., 291.

¹²⁹ Ibid., 291.

¹³⁰ Ibid., 291–292.

¹³¹ Boshoff, "Overview of Security Sector Reform Processes in the DRC," 63–64.

¹³² Joanne Richards, "DDR in DRC: The Impact of Command and Control," Geneva Institute of International and Development Studies (2012), 3, <http://www.usip.org/site/default/files/case-study-competitional/20130322-DDR-in-DRC.pdf>.

As these DDR efforts were under way, a new security challenge emerged. In February 2006, two armed brigades of RCD, the 81th and the 83rd, refused to integrate into the national army.¹³³ In July 2006, Laurent Nkunda, the ex-RCD leader, created a new political and military group named the National Congress for the Defense of the People, which included his RCD brigade and other ex-combatants.¹³⁴ This rebel group allied itself with Rwanda under the pretext of protecting the Congolese Tutsi population. This development, in turn, led to other militia groups, such as the Mai-Mai Kifuafula, Coalition of Congolese Patriotic Resistance, and related Mayi- Mayi groups to reemerge to counter the National Congress for the Defense of the People.¹³⁵

Within CONADER, the government launched a second program, called the Disarmament and Community Reintegration program (DCR), which was based in Ituri province. The DCR program began on September 1, 2004, as a Rapid Response mechanism and ended in June 2005.¹³⁶ This program was for ex-combatants from armed groups who were not the signatories of the Global and All-Inclusive Peace agreement, which initially disqualified them from the first phase of the DDR program run by the PNDDR. Seven militia groups: the Revolutionary Front for Ituri, the Popular Front for Democracy in Congo, the Party for Unity and Safeguarding the Integrity of Congo, the Union of Congolese Patriots, the Union of Congolese Patriots, the Popular Armed Forces for the Congo, and the FNI were eligible to participate in this DDR program.¹³⁷

¹³³ “Congolese Tutsi in the Troubled DRC Equation,” accessed February 20, 2016, <http://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/congolese-tutsi-troubled-drc-equation>; “Congo’s Election: Making or Breaking the Peace,” (Report No 108): 177–182, April 2006, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/16642/108_congo_elections_making_or_breaking_the_peace.pdf.

¹³⁴ “Small Arms Survey: Demobilization in the DRC, Armed Groups and the Role of Organizational Control,” Armed Actors Issue Brief No 1 (April 2013), <http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/G-Issue-briefs/SAS-AA-IB1-DDR-in-the-DRC.pdf>; “Congo; Bringing Peace to North Kivu,” International Crisis Group, (Africa Report 133), October 31, 2007, http://www.kongo-kinshasa.de/dokumente/ngo/icg_0710_en.pdf.

¹³⁵ Richards, “DDR in DRC: The Impact of Command and Control,” 3.

¹³⁶ Tsjeard Bouta, “Assessment of the Ituri Disarmament and Community Reinsertion Program (DCR),” Netherlands Institute of International Relations, ‘Clingendael’ Conflict Research Unit (May 2005), 13, https://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/20050500_cru_other_bouta.pdf; Marriage, “Flip-flop Rebel, Dollar Soldier, 292; Bryden and Scherrer, “Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration and Security Sector Reform,” 147.

¹³⁷ Bouta, “Assessment of the Ituri Disarmament and Community Reinsertion Program,” 11.

Under the DCR program, the government offered the ex-combatants two options: they could join the national army, or return to civilian life. The UNDP operated the community rehabilitation portion of the program, and reintegration camps were responsible for returning ex-combatants to civilian life. The program started by providing a three-day-long course in how to return to civilian life, followed by a USD 50 allowance for the ex-soldier and one month's food supply for his family.¹³⁸ National authorities such as CONADER, as well as FARDC, MONUC, the Integrated Military Structure, supported by international organizations including the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and UNDP reinforced this program,¹³⁹ which succeeded in demobilizing 15,811 individuals. However, only 20 percent of their weapons were collected. Moreover, of the 6,200 weapons secured, 70 percent were old and unusable, suggesting that ex-combatants did not truly disarm.¹⁴⁰ In Ituri, several agencies disputed the figures given on numbers of disarmed militia members. For example, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) claimed 12,500 former soldiers surrendered their weapons, while IRIN News put the figure at only 9,000 combatants.¹⁴¹ Ultimately, the exact numbers of ex-combatants who returned to civilian life and the number disarmed or the number of weapons collected remains unknown.

Despite these initiatives aimed at demobilizing and disarming combatants, a February 2006 UNDP report revealed a high level of insecurity and fear across society, generated primarily by weak security sector institutions. Police and FARDC, in particular, were named as the sources of insecurity, harassing civilians, demanding bribes, extorting illegal taxes, and abusing human rights.¹⁴² The report suggests that lack of proper training, low salaries, or slow payment of salaries led security forces to engage

¹³⁸ Marriage, "Flip-flop Rebel, Dollar Soldier," 292.

¹³⁹ Bouta, "Assessment of the Ituri Disarmament and Community Reinsertion Program," 15.

¹⁴⁰ James-Emanuel Wanki, "Disarming War, Arming Peace: The Congo Crisis, Dag Hammarskjöld's Legacy and the Future Role of MONUC in the Democratic Republic of the Congo," *The African Journal on Conflict Resolution* 11, no. 1, March 27, 2011, <http://www.accord.org.za/ajcr-issues/disarming-war-arming-peace/>.

¹⁴¹ Marriage, "Flip-flop Rebel, Dollar Soldier," 292.

¹⁴² Carrol Faubert, "Evaluation of UNDP Assistance to Conflict-affected Countries," UNDP Evaluation Office, (2006): 9–10, <http://www.undp.org/eo/documents/thematic/conflict/ConflictEvaluation2006.Pdf>.

in illegal activities rather than protect the population.¹⁴³ Furthermore, the deterioration of security prompted many ex-soldiers to take up weapons again to defend themselves and engage in criminal activities to survive. Increased insecurity also encouraged communities to form communal militia groups for protection.¹⁴⁴ All of these developments undermined the DDR programs.

Between 2004 and 2006, an estimated 102,014 individuals were demobilized, including 99,854 men and 2,160 women, of whom 83,986 individuals were integrated into the FARDC, including 1,560 women and 82,426 men. The program also disarmed 186,000 combatants, including 182,280 men and 3,720 women.¹⁴⁵ Despite these impressive figures, the exact number of individuals successfully and permanently reintegrated into civilian life was not documented, nor was the total number of weapons collected or number of individuals who were disarmed. Nevertheless, in June 2006, CONADER closed 18 Orientation Centers due to a lack of funds and the DDR program ceased.¹⁴⁶

CONADER was replaced on July 14, 2007, by a newly formed governmental agency named *l'Unité d'Execution du Programme National de Desarmement, Demobilisation et Reinsertion*.¹⁴⁷ This new agency marked the beginning of the second phase of the DDR program, which ran from July 2008 until December 2009. However, unrest in the eastern part of the country, particularly in North and South Kivu, delayed the program from opening for one year. The budget was USD 75 million, and the major donor was the World Bank while UNDP and PNDDR managed the program.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴³ Ibid., 9.

¹⁴⁴ Willems and Hans, "Connecting Community Security and DDR," 19.

¹⁴⁵ Henri Boshoff, "Completing the Demobilisation, Disarmament, and Reintegration Process of Armed Groups in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Link to Security Sector Reform of FARDC: Mission Difficult!" *Institute for Security Studies* 23 (November 23, 2010): 3, https://www.issafrica.org/uploads/SitRep2010_23Nov.pdf.

¹⁴⁶ "Demobilization in the DRC, Armed Groups and the Role of Organizational Control," Small Arms Survey, 6.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid., 6.

¹⁴⁸ Boshoff, "Completing the Demobilisation, Disarmament, and Reintegration Process of Armed Groups in the Democratic Republic of Congo," 1–3.

Under this program, the ex-combatants had two options: demobilize and join FARDC, or integrate into civilian life. Combatants who decided to become soldiers were reallocated to the detention center and integrated to military forces. Over its six-month tenure, the program engaged in a continuous process of disarming, demobilizing, and reintegrating the signatories of the Global and All-Inclusive Agreements of December 17, 2002. During the program's six months of operation, from June to December 2009, an estimated 12,820 individuals were disarmed, of whom 4,782 were demobilized and 8,038 integrated into the FARDC.¹⁴⁹ The exact number of individuals returned to civilian life and the number of weapons collected remain undocumented.

The limited success of this DDR effort led to the UN Security and Stabilization Support Strategy and the Congolese *Programme de Stabilisation et de Reconstruction des Zones Sortant des Conflicts Armes* (SRAREC) taking over this program. Under the SRAREC the DDR program succeeded in demobilizing an additional 2,000 combatants in 2010.¹⁵⁰ The DDR programs are summarized in Table 4.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., 4.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., 4.

Table 4. Summary of the DDR programs in DRC¹⁵¹

Program	Goal	Time frame	Disarm	Demobilize/ Reinsert	Repatriate	Reintegrated
DRC and MONUC program (DDRRR)	Repatriate and disarm foreign fighters in DRC	90 days	402 individuals	MONUC claimed FRDL not demobilized	Rwandan claimed 23,400 repatriated. DRC claimed 20,000 RPA remained	N/A
First National Program (PNDDR)	Demobilize and reintegrate 330,000 individuals	2 years	186,000 individuals (182,280 men, 3720 women)	102,014 (99,854 men, 2,160 women)	N/A	83,986 integrated into army (82,426 men, 1,560 women)
Second National Program	Demobilize and integrate ex-soldiers	15 months (Effectively implemented 6 months)	12,820 Individuals	4,782	N/A	8,038 integrated into Army
DCR Program in Ituri (PNDDR)	Demobilize and Disarm militias	10 months	USAID claimed 12,500. IRIN claimed 9,000 (6,200 weapons)	15,811	N/A	N/A

¹⁵¹ Adapted from Henry Boshoff, "Completing the Demobilisation, Disarmament, and Reintegration Process of Armed Groups in the Democratic Republic of Congo," 1–3; Wanki, "Disarming War, Arming Peace;" Marriage, "Flip-flop Rebel, Dollar Soldier," 292.

E. THE DRC TODAY

Today, the DRC remains fragile and conflict-ridden, with limited security and weak government institutions. In 2009, the Stabilization and Recovery Funding Facility for the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo was established with the aim of addressing government weaknesses in providing services to the population. Since 2009, it has contributed almost 60 percent of the operating funds to support the DRC. Furthermore, the government of the DRC depends on financial management from UNDP for how to utilize multi-donor funds in collaboration with the Office of the Prime Minister.¹⁵² Despite these efforts, the country's economy remains weak, resulting in its reliance on international donors and agencies as its main source of revenue for running the government. However, money from donors does not cover the DRC's budget for government expenditures.

In addition to a lack of infrastructure and services, DRC continues to struggle with providing basic security across the country. According to a January 2013 UNDP report, the government of the DRC only weakly controls the western parts of the country while the eastern part remains ungoverned. Roads and other critical infrastructure remain poor, further hindering both security and the economy. Ultimately, the government has never addressed the key factors and fundamentals that led to the outbreak of warfare.¹⁵³ In addition, the weakness of formal government institutions has undermined attempts to prevent violence and protect populations. The persistence of militias and rebels groups is evidence of the failure of the government to protect the country and its citizens.

Despite all of these efforts aimed at reform, Rouw and Willems contend that the security structure in the DRC is still weak. Some security forces exist, but mainly in urban areas, while the countryside depends on local leaders such as the village chiefs for solving social and security problems. Problems, however, frequently arise when not all

¹⁵² "Evaluation of UNDP Supports to Conflict-affected Countries in the Context of UN Peace Operations, United Nations Development Programme, Evaluation Office," January 2013, 44, <http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/corporate/Executive%20Board/2013/English/Evaluation%20of%20UNDP%20support%20to%20conflict%20affected%20countries.pdf>.

¹⁵³ Ibid., 19–20.

accept the decisions of local leadership. The absence of FARDC and police in rural communities widens the insecurity gap.¹⁵⁴

Autesserre stresses that the absence of state authority in the eastern province, especially in the rural areas, has created an environment conducive for citizens to join militias and armed groups for self-protection.¹⁵⁵ Furthermore, Autesserre notes that local government structures are corrupt, further hindering trust and cooperation by the population.¹⁵⁶ These factors have contributed to members of the community arming themselves for protection against criminal gangs and security forces. In other words, weak governance and lawlessness in the eastern Congo have created fertile conditions for the emergence of militia groups that threaten the security of the local population.

To date, the DRC continues to experience high rates of violence but much lower than at the height of the Congo war, massacres, and violations of human rights despite the presence of UN peacekeepers. According to a 2014 UN report on the DRC, 11,769 cases related to rape and violence toward women that occurred in Katanga, Maniema, Orientale, and South Kivu and North Kivu can be attributed to armed individuals.¹⁵⁷ In eastern DRC, the ADF, FDLR, and other Mayi–Mayi groups continue to attack villages, massacre civilians, perpetrate abuses, and commit human rights violations. In 2014, the ADF attacked 35 villages and allegedly killed more than 650 people.¹⁵⁸

According to one human rights report, between 2012 and 2014, Congolese armed forces as well as non-state armed groups were responsible for killing civilians, kidnappings, burning homes, committing mass rapes, and forcibly recruiting children as

¹⁵⁴ Willems and Hans, “Connecting Community Security and DDR,” 15–18.

¹⁵⁵ Autesserre, *The Trouble with the Congo*, 71.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 71.

¹⁵⁷ “United Nations: Security Council, Conflict-related Sexual Violence,” Report of the Secretary-General, S/2015/203 (March 23, 2015), 7–33, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2015_203.pdf.

¹⁵⁸ “Populations in the Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo Remain at Imminent Risk of Possible Mass Atrocity Crimes Perpetrated by Armed Groups,” Global Centre for Responsibility to Protect: Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), accessed July 5, 2016, http://www.globalr2p.org/regions/democratic_republic_of_the_congo_drc; “ADF Rebel Group Responsible for Grave international Humanitarian Law Violations, United Nations Human Rights: DR Congo,” accessed July 5, 2016, <http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=15952&LangID=E>.

soldiers in eastern Congo. By using schools for military combat operations, the armed forces prevented children from attending school for fear of being captured and forced to join them. The ADF, M23, FDLR, APCLS, Mai-Mai Kifuafua, Nduma Defense of Congo, Nyatura, Raia Mutomoki, and Congolese armed forces were all implicated in actions like these.¹⁵⁹

The perseverance of militias and illegally armed forces demonstrates the weakness of the government in providing security to its citizens, and points to the overall failure of the DDR programs. Persistence of violence and the presence of different armed groups have only exacerbated insecurity and confused the population as to who the public should rely on for their protection. Lack of security has forced people to flee from the fighting to save their lives, thus reducing their engagement in economic activities. In many cases, economic hardship has compelled former soldiers to return to their original job as fighters. Former soldiers have also resorted to selling weapons or joining criminal groups to earn money.¹⁶⁰

Not surprisingly, the DRC's overall economic situation remains weak. Despite DRC being one of the world's most mineral rich countries, it has one of the world's highest rates of poverty. Yet, economic growth has been improving and the poverty rate fell from 71 percent in 2005 to 63 percent in 2012, according to the World Bank.¹⁶¹ However, DRC's persistently high poverty rate reflects the country's high rate of unemployment, with the majority of the population relying on informal employment activities and agriculture for survival. In particular, insecurity in eastern parts of the DRC prevents people there from being able to participate in economic activities. According to the World Bank Report of 2014, the DRC was ranked 176 out of 187 countries in

¹⁵⁹ "Our School Became the Battlefield: Using Schools for Child Recruitment and Military Purposes in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo," Human Rights Watch, accessed July 8, 2016, <https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/10/27/our-school-became-battlefield/using-schools-child-recruitment-and-military>.

¹⁶⁰ Willems and Hans, "Connecting Community Security and DDR," 25–26.

¹⁶¹ "Democratic Republic of Congo," World Bank: Country Overview, accessed April 8, 2016, <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/drc/overview>.

economic development with per capita income of USD 380, which is the lowest in the world.¹⁶²

F. CONCLUSION

This chapter began by outlining the causes of the first and second Congolese wars and describing the different rebel groups, government forces including of other countries, and ethnic militias that drove the outcome of these conflicts. The 1999 Lusaka peace agreement paved the way for the numerous peace accords to end the war in the DRC, prompting the DDR(RR) and DRR programs aimed at promoting long-term peace and security in the DRC and Great Lakes region. But despite these efforts to establish peace in the DRC, insecurity and violence have persisted in the eastern part of the country, particularly in South and North Kivu.

The next chapter analyzes the DDR programs in the DRC, using the criteria and framework created in Chapter II, with the aim of better understanding the conditions that led to the failure of the DDR programs in establishing peace and stability in the DRC. The next chapter also provides conclusions and recommendations for the success of future DDR programs in the Great Lakes region and Africa more broadly.

¹⁶² Ibid.

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IV. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. ANALYSIS OF DDR PROGRAMS IN THE DRC

The decades-long wars in the DRC have created regional instability, as well as political and social turmoil within the Congo; destroyed the country's economy; and cost countless civilian lives. Chapter III described the conditions that led up to the wars in Congo, the different government forces that participated in the conflict, the rebel groups and defense militias that were formed in these wars, and the various DDR programs initiated as part of several peace accords designed to help end the conflict. Ultimately, domestic and international efforts aimed at repatriating foreign troops and demobilizing the thousands of armed individuals failed, and conflict has persisted in the DRC, including rapes, abductions, looting, and other violent crimes.

The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the efforts of the four DDR programs initiated to sustain peace and security in the DRC after the 2002 Pretoria Peace Agreement, and to understand better what succeeded and failed during the implementation of these programs. The chapter begins by providing a summary of short-term efforts to demobilize, disarm, and repatriate various forces, noting key obstacles to success. The chapter then provides an in-depth analysis of reintegration efforts and goals of the DDR programs using the framework created in Chapter II—security, law and justice; economic opportunity; and good relations with the neighboring countries as well as their corresponding measures of effectiveness—to better understand what led to the failure of the DDR programs.

Ultimately, this analysis finds that an unrealistically short timeline, insufficient funds, an overemphasis on disarmament, and the failure to include all key warring parties in the DDR process created major obstacles to success in short-term efforts to demobilize armed individuals and groups in the DRC. Long-term reintegration efforts have been hindered by poor linkages between DDR and security sector reform and the continued need for community-based security to fill the gap provided by insufficient and poorly trained government forces; the lack of government institutions or capacity to implement

and oversee reintegration programs; a chronically weak economic sector and lack of jobs; and continued tension with the DRC's neighbors, particularly Rwanda. Given these findings, the timeframe for DDR(RR) in DRC should be a minimum of 15 years to allow enough time to conduct a comprehensive program that includes security sector reform, jobs programs, community-based activism, and a focus on the economy.

B. ANALYSIS OF DEMOBILIZATION, DISARMAMENT, AND REPATRIATION EFFORTS

Chapter III described initial efforts aimed at demobilizing, disarming, and repatriating foreign forces as part of the 2002 Pretoria Accords. The accords set the following goals for these efforts: task the Congolese army to find, disarm, dismantle and repatriate ex-FAR and Interahamwe, which created the FDLR; and remove the RPF from DRC.¹⁶³ Ultimately, the program only succeeded in disarming 402 individuals and there was a disagreement on the number of repatriated troops; specifically, Rwanda claimed it withdrew 23,400 troops during the timeframe.¹⁶⁴ However, the DRC claimed that 20,000 Rwandan soldiers remained under the umbrella of the RCD in Kivu. A 2003 UN report claimed the FDLR had not been demobilized at all.¹⁶⁵

Yet another set of accords, the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement Peace Accords, were signed between the DRC government, rebels, and militia groups on December 17, 2002. The accords outlined the formation of a temporary regime, headed by Joseph Kabila and four vice presidents, who were sworn into office in July of 2003.¹⁶⁶ The Congolese government also launched a nationwide DDR program. The first phase ran from October 2004 to December 2006, and the second phase started in July 2008 and was completed in December 2009. Alongside this nationwide program, a separate DDR program was created specifically in Ituri province from September 1, 2004, to June 2005. Ultimately, the first phase of the nationwide DDR program succeeded in demobilizing

¹⁶³ Marriage, "Flip-flop Rebel, Dollar Soldier," 290; "Profile of Internal Displacement: Democratic Republic of the Congo," 17.

¹⁶⁴ Marriage, "Flip-flop Rebel, Dollar Soldier," 294.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid., 294.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid., 292.

102,014 individuals, disarming 186,000 individuals, and integrating 83, 986 individuals into the national army. The second phase of the DDR program succeeded in demobilizing 4,782 individuals, disarming 12,820 individuals, and integrating 8,038 individuals into the national army.¹⁶⁷ The Ituri program succeeded in demobilizing 15,811 individuals and collecting 6,200 weapons, of which 70 percent were old and unusable.¹⁶⁸ Several agencies disputed the figures on disarmed militias in Ituri. USAID, for example, claimed 12,500 combatants were disarmed, while IRIN News put the figure at only 9,000 combatants.¹⁶⁹

Although the exact number of those repatriated, demobilized, and disarmed remains debated, hundreds of thousands participated in these DDR programs, making these programs some of the largest in the region, if not the world. However, from 2002 to 2009, despite a large number of participants, violence and insecurity have persisted in the DRC, but much lower than period of war. Four factors, in particular, contributed significantly to the shortcomings of these DDR programs: an unrealistically short timeline, insufficient funds, an overemphasis on disarmament, and the failure to include all key warring parties in the DDR process. These problems, which will be described in greater detail in the following section, created major obstacles to the success of short-term efforts to demobilize armed individuals and groups in the DRC.

1. Timeline

All of the DDR programs initiated in the DRC suffered from unrealistically short timelines. First, the Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Resettlement, and Reintegration program that targeted external fighters such as Rwandan troops (RPA), former *Forces Armees Rwandaises* (ex-FAR), FDLR, and Interahamwe forces set only 90 days as the timeframe for the pull-out of Rwandan armed forces, and the dismantlement of ex-FAR and Interahamwe.¹⁷⁰ As described earlier, although tens of thousands of

¹⁶⁷ Boshoff, "Completing the Demobilisation, Disarmament, and Reintegration Process of Armed Groups in the Democratic Republic of Congo," 3–4.

¹⁶⁸ Wanki, "Disarming War, Arming Peace."

¹⁶⁹ Marriage, "Flip-flop Rebel, Dollar Soldier," 292.

¹⁷⁰ Malan and Boshoff, "A 90-day Plan to Bring Peace to the DRC?," 1.

individuals were repatriated, the program failed to remove all foreign troops, and an estimated 20,000 Rwandan units, in particular, remained in Kivu. Furthermore, the number of individuals disarmed was so small—only 402—that it most likely had no effect on the security environment.¹⁷¹ Following this initial attempt and its shortcomings, the Congolese government initiated new accords for the demobilization of foreign troops in October 2004. However, the ex-FAR and Interahamwe refused to sign the agreement until March 31, 2005, while the FDLR refused to comply with the agreement at all, compelling the FARDC to attempt to forcibly disarm these units, without success.¹⁷²

Ultimately, this phase of the DDR process was too short to implement the Demobilize, Disarm, and Repatriate stages of the process, and dismantle the ex-FAR, Interahamwe, and the FDLR. The timeline, measured in days and months, had little impact on solving major issues, and instead increased pressure to achieve quick results and prevented overseers from tackling the most difficult problems associated with removing and repatriating forces from DRC. Specifically, at the time of the DDR(RR) program, the FDRL had lived on Congo's soil for two decades, allowing these forces to become established in the country, gain familiarity with the terrain, and build networks among the population. Altogether, the rebel fighters remained scattered in South and North Kivu, and the Virunga forest, making it difficult to track, identify, and ensure that all forces had been removed from the DRC.

Furthermore, the short timeline did not allow sufficient time to create and consolidate government troops that could oversee the process. Repatriating foreign troops required credible, professional, well-equipped, and trained military forces to conduct the operation. However, at the time of the DDR(RR) program, the FARDC was a fusion of various rebel groups and government forces that lacked basic military training and discipline. These forces were compelled to undertake this job without competent knowledge or skills, and the short timeframe prevented effective consolidation or training of these forces. These forces also lacked major equipment and the intelligence necessary for conducting the mission. The difficulty of this task was compounded due to the fact the

¹⁷¹ Marriage, "Flip-flop Rebel, Dollar Soldier," 294.

¹⁷² *Ibid.*, 294.

ex-FAR and Interahamwe established strong social ties and networks with the Congolese population.

Moreover, the DRC government did not have sufficient infrastructure to demobilize, disarm, and repatriate these forces, and the short timeframe did not allow enough time to build these resources. Under these conditions, it became difficult if not impossible to account for forces demobilized, or ensure that they had been repatriated. A lack of infrastructure was most likely one of the reasons why it was so difficult to account for an actual number of troops demobilized and repatriated at the end of the program.

The short timeline also did not allow sufficient time for UN forces to deploy and help implement the repatriation process. The UN has no standing army or police force of its own; it depends on the contribution of forces from member states and it takes time to assemble and train these forces before they can deploy. The rapid and short timeframe assigned to the implementation of the repatriation process did not allow sufficient time for these forces to assemble and deploy. Ultimately, in 2002, the MONUC deployed only 8,700 troops in the DRC, not nearly a sufficient number for overseeing such a large DDR program or for providing general security to the areas where the DDR process was occurring.

Finally, the short timeframe for repatriating foreign forces did not allow for investigations or trials of foreign troops in the DRC. As described in Chapter III, these troops were accused of brutalizing the local population and of committing acts of murder, rape, criminal activities, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. The speed with which the accords called for repatriating foreign fighters prevented them from being held accountable for these crimes.

James-Emmanuel Wanki, in fact, argues that the DDRRR process sidelined the local population altogether, which not only led to a sense of injustice but also missed opportunities for learning more about various fighting groups. For example, Wanki argues that MONUC, by not being able to ally itself with the communities, failed to receive vital information from the local individuals on armed groups' whereabouts, armament stores, and movements. In other words, MONUC and other agencies that

promoted the DDR process lacked comprehensive skills and support from local communities, which led to the failure of the program.¹⁷³

2. Insufficient Funds

Another key obstacle to successfully executing the DDR programs in DRC, both in the short term and over time, was lack of funding. As described in Chapter III, the national demobilization programs offered two tracks: former combatants could choose between integrating into the national forces, and reintegrating into society. However, the funds allocated for these two tracks were unbalanced, with the majority of funds going towards demobilization—USD 200 million—and only USD 14 million for integration and army reform.¹⁷⁴ This lack of funding greatly hindered security sector reform initiatives, which will be discussed in Section C. Insufficient funds also caused the DRR program to run out of money halfway through the proposed process and created gaps in services for those wishing to demobilize and those already demobilized.

Wanki echoes these observations, stressing that the demobilization process was slow-paced, with multiple delays in payments and unfulfilled promises to those who chose reintegration into civilian life. He notes that hundreds of demobilized ex-soldiers demonstrated against delays in payments in the provinces of Kasenyi, Mahagi, Kwandroma, and Aveba.¹⁷⁵ The slowed process of reintegration that resulted from lack of funds led to diminished trust in the DDR program and discouraged those who had joined the program; it most likely also deterred others from joining the DDR program as well.

3. Overemphasizing Disarmament

The overall objective of DDR is to support former combatants to be effective members of society and stop fighting. As described in Chapter II, literature on DDR stresses the importance of disarmament in this process, assuming that the presence of

¹⁷³ Wanki, “Disarming War, Arming Peace.”

¹⁷⁴ Marriage, “Flip-flop Rebel, Dollar Soldier,” 291.

¹⁷⁵ Wanki, “Disarming War, Arming Peace.”

weapons is a hindrance to peace and disarming individuals and groups is necessary for lasting stability. The DDR(RR) program and national DDR programs in the DRC followed this line of reasoning, making disarmament one of its top priorities. However, as described in Chapter III, efforts to disarm groups and individuals were unsuccessful. As mentioned in Chapter III, Section D, and Chapter IV, Section B, the DDR(RR) program only succeeded in disarming a reported 402 individuals.¹⁷⁶ The PNDDR-led nationwide DDR program succeeded in disarming 186,000 individuals in the first phase and 12,820 individuals in the second phase.¹⁷⁷ In Ituri, between 9,000 and 12,500 combatants were disarmed.¹⁷⁸ The total number of collected weapons for the national program is unknown, but, for the Ituri program, the figure was 6,200 weapons, of which 70 percent were old and unusable, suggesting that ex-combatants did not truly disarm.¹⁷⁹ Ultimately, given the hundreds of thousands of armed individuals, the number of those who were disarmed is low.

Several factors may have contributed to these low disarmament numbers. Seems like economic programs has to be made in order to improve security. But that poor security impedes other units of good governance and economic progress. A paradox of economic opportunity, low wages, and persisting insecurity may have discouraged the ex-combatants from returning functioning weapons and keeping them for future use. The enormity of the task and lack of success in disarming combatants in the DRC throws into question the focus on disarmament as a necessary path to peace. As will be proposed in the next section, it may be more worthwhile to focus instead on addressing the causes of insecurity, such as lack of jobs, insufficient and corrupt security forces, and ethnic-based grievances, rather than committing time and money to attempting to rid a conflict of weapons.

¹⁷⁶ Marriage, “Flip-flop Rebel, Dollar Soldier,” 294.

¹⁷⁷ Boshoff, “Overview of Security Sector Reform Processes in the DRC,” 2–3.

¹⁷⁸ Marriage, “Flip-flop Rebel, Dollar Soldier,” 292.

¹⁷⁹ Wanki, “Disarming War, Arming Peace.”

C. REINTEGRATION EFFORTS AND LONG-TERM SUCCESS

As argued in Chapter II, reintegration is the most important stage in the DDR process for creating lasting peace, because it focuses on long-term efforts to fully return ex-combatants to civilian life. This stage often includes programs like vocational training, psychological care, and community-based reconciliation efforts. More broadly, three broad sectors need to be developed to achieve lasting success in DDR: law and justice; economic opportunity; and good relations with neighboring countries. In other words, reintegration requires greater resources and a more holistic approach for success. Each of these variables is considered in the following subsections.

1. Law and Justice

Perhaps one of the greatest obstacles to lasting peace in the DRC has been the lack of security sector reform throughout the country, particularly in the east, and how this has negatively affected law, order, and justice. Sean McFate, for example, stresses that DDR and security sector reform are symbiotic programs that are mutually reinforcing; thus, failure to address both simultaneously will most likely lead to failure. Improper reintegration of former combatants in the DDR process, for example, can complicate and compromise security sector reform. If they are done simultaneously and properly, however, a state can begin to provide its own security and uphold the rule of law, essential components in lieu of development as well as fixing fragile states. However, without addressing the larger issue of creating a safe and secure environment for all citizens, communities may resort to relying on local actors for their security, such as ethnic, religious, or community-based militias.¹⁸⁰

The DRC was unable to meaningfully change and develop its security sector, thus undercutting its DDR programs and state development. Autesserre, for example, stresses that the absence of authority in the eastern province, especially in the rural areas, created an environment conducive to citizens joining militias and armed groups for self-protection. Furthermore, Autesserre notes that local government structures were corrupt,

¹⁸⁰ Sean McFate, “The Link between DDR and SSR in Conflict-affected Countries” (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2010): 2–3, <http://www.usip.org/publications/the-link-between-ddr-and-ssr-in-conflict-affected-countries>.

further undercutting popular support of the government overall, including the security it provided.¹⁸¹ These factors contributed to the community hiding weapons for self-protection from criminal gangs and government security forces. Under the supervision of traditional chiefs, communities organized local militia groups for protection, which weakened the progress of DDR programs. Thus, weak governance and lawlessness in eastern Congo created fertile conditions for the emergence of militia groups that threatened the security of the local population.

A Human Rights Report echoes that government forces, in addition to militias and rebel groups, undermined law and order in the DRC. The report notes that, between 2012 and 2014, non-state armed groups *and* Congolese armed forces in eastern Congo were responsible for kidnappings, killing civilians, committing rapes, burning homes, and enslaving children as soldiers. The armed forces used schools for military combat operations thereby preventing children from attending school for fear of being captured and forced to join these groups. The ADF, M23, Mai-Mai Kifuafua, Nduma defense of Congo, Nyatura, Raia Mutomoki, and Congolese armed forces all perpetrated these acts.¹⁸²

Ultimately, the perseverance of militias and illegally armed forces demonstrates the regime's inability to provide security to its citizens, the breakdown of law and order, as well as the overall failure of the DDR programs. Persistence of violence and the presence of different armed groups have increased insecurity and confused the population about whom to rely on for their protection. Moreover, lack of security has forced people to flee conflict zones, creating additional problems of internally displaced people and their reduced engagement in economic activities.

Despite these challenges, the DRC government, along with international agencies such as UNDP, did attempt to address issues of justice in DDR programs by supporting local communities and their efforts to accept ex-soldiers. Specifically, UNDP helped create community development and participation programs aimed at reducing tensions

¹⁸¹ Autesserre, *The Trouble with the Congo*, 71.

¹⁸² "Our School Became the Battlefield," Human Rights Watch, 2–5.

between former soldiers and local communities and underscoring that both parties were the victims of fighting. For example, in Ituri district, UNDP used fishing cooperatives to integrate villagers and former combatants. This development project, which focused on demobilizing ex-combatants, benefited both ex-fighters and communities members and helped to motivate peace and harmony among them.¹⁸³

However, overall law and order have remained a critical problem for the DRC and have affected both its economic prospects and its relationships with its neighbors.

2. Economic Development

The DRC falls in the category of deprived nations globally, with the highest rates of poverty for the period of 2005 through 2012—during which the rate of poverty ranged from 71 percent to 63 percent, respectively—despite the progress in its economy and decline in poverty, according to the World Bank.¹⁸⁴ Because the country's economy is still weak, the vast majority of the population depends on self-employment activities to survive, such as informal employment activities and agricultural activities. Other sectors such as mining, manufacturing, and the service industry are not well established, although the potential for these sectors of the economy is enormous. Prolonged insecurity has affected the growth of the economy, foreign investment, and the development of the private sector.

Equally importantly, the education infrastructure was destroyed during the war, and the government has yet to repair this vital aspect of the economy. As described in Chapter II, Section C, several scholars note the importance of investing in human capital for building capacity for citizens to engage in economic, social, and development activities for the well-being of the country and population.¹⁸⁵ Within this broad goal, developing human capital and economic opportunity are critical for transforming ex-combatants into productive citizens of society. The DRC and international donors appear

¹⁸³ Faubert, "United Nations Development Programme Evaluation Office, Case Study Democratic Republic of Congo," 25.

¹⁸⁴ "Democratic Republic of Congo," World Bank: Country Overview.

¹⁸⁵ Ghani, Lockhart, and Carnahan, "Closing the Sovereignty Gap: An Approach to State-building," 7.

to have understood the importance of education for rehabilitating post-conflict society. Joanne Richards, for example, notes that the national DDR program created initiatives aimed at helping former combatants to return to civilian life by providing vocational training, schooling, agricultural activities, and other programs.¹⁸⁶

However, as described in the Section B of this chapter, the national DDR program ran out of funds in 2006 and was forced to close for over a year before being revived for one final year of operation. In total, the government committed around eight years of effort to reintegrating hundreds of thousands of ex-fighters to civilian life. Although the national programs included some unique economic projects, like the fishing cooperative mentioned previously, there was neither enough time nor money to create and sustain programs that would have given ex-combatants available alternatives to fighting. Moreover, the collapsed education system and fragile economy, exacerbated by chronic insecurity, have prevented the population from contributing to the country's economic growth or individual economic security.

3. Relationships with Neighboring Countries

As described in Chapter III, following the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, Hutus fled to the DRC and became another source of instability during the Congolese wars. The ex-FAR/Interahamwe and FDLR military worked alongside Congolese foot soldiers during these wars, creating social bonds, business relationships, networks, and trust between the Congolese military and FDLR. The presence of Rwandan forces also created tensions with ex-FAR/Interahamwe and Hutus in the DRC, which became a lasting problem for security and stability in the DRC. In addition to Rwandan forces, the DRC also had to contend with other foreign troops on its soil, especially Ugandan forces, which required DDR(RR) programs aimed at their removal.

As described in Chapter II, efforts aimed at removing and repatriating foreign forces from the DRC fell short of completely removing neighboring countries' troops, particularly Rwandan forces. These shortcomings were the result of an unrealistically

¹⁸⁶ Richards, "DDR in DRC: The Impact of Command and Control," 3.

short time frame, lack of resources and infrastructure, insufficient number of government and MONUC forces, and no mechanisms for accountability.

In October 2004, the United States initiated the formation of a tripartite joint commission among the DRC, Uganda, and Rwanda to build better relationships among these countries and to address foreign fighters in the DRC specifically. The DRC and Uganda signed the Ngurdoto Agreement in September 2007, which aimed to remove illegal rebel fighters that conduct military activities in both countries. This accord was followed by the Nairobi Communique in November 2007, an agreement between the DRC and Rwanda intended to enhance teamwork support in disarming, demobilizing, reintegrating, or repatriating external fighters such as FDLR, ex-FAR, and Hutu militias operating inside the DRC. In 2009, the Congolese government restored ambassadorial ties to Uganda, Burundi, and Rwanda, which led to bilateral talks and meetings between the DRC and each of these heads of state.¹⁸⁷

While these efforts to build better relations among the DRC, Uganda, and Rwanda are noteworthy, neighboring countries, particularly Rwanda, have continued to support rebel forces in the DRC. According to a Relief Web report, Rwanda aided the Congolese Tutsis who had deserted from the FARDC following a mutiny on April 4, 2012, to form the March 23 (M23) rebel group. The M23 became a political-military movement comprised of disgruntled Congolese Tutsi who were unified in the FARDC after the peace deal on March 23, 2009, but then deserted when promises went unfulfilled, including the government's failure to protect the Tutsi population in North Kivu and its inability to dismantle the FDLR.¹⁸⁸ A report from a UN group of experts publicized that the Rwanda regime, headed by the minister of defense James Kaberege, actually ran the M23.¹⁸⁹ In March 2013, the UN passed Resolution 2098 that authorized the use of

¹⁸⁷ "DR Congo - Foreign Relations," GlobalSecurity.org, accessed September 13, 2016, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/congo/forrel.htm>,

¹⁸⁸ "Mapping Conflict Motives: M23," International Peace Information Service, accessed September 28, 2016, http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/20121130_Mapping_Conflict_Motives_M23.pdf.

¹⁸⁹ "Mapping Conflict Motives: M23," 5–18; Janet McKnight, "Surrendering to the Big Picture: Historical and Legal Perspectives on Accountability in the Democratic Republic of Congo Following the Defeat of the March 23 Movement," *Stability: International Journal of Security and Development* 3, no. 1 (2014): 5–18, <http://www.stabilityjournal.org/articles/10.5334/sta.de/>.

offensive operations in eastern DRC to counter M23, and the rebel group was finally neutralized in November 2013.¹⁹⁰ Clearly, more work is needed to build better relationships between the DRC and its neighbors, and to create mechanisms for removing foreign fighters from the DRC.

D. RECOMMENDATIONS

The protracted armed conflict in the DRC is the product of decades of poor governance, ethnic conflict, interference and spillover violence from neighboring states, other states' interest in Congolese natural resources, insufficient and unprofessional security forces. Decades of insecurity have produced an array of illegally armed groups and militias with a variety of different goals. Given this complicated and lengthy history, creating a DDR program that truly reintegrates ex-combatants back into civilian life or integrates them with government forces requires a holistic approach that not only focuses on the fighter but also on society, the economy, and the government. And while this task is enormous, steps can be taken in the near term to help move the DRC in a better direction.

This thesis concludes with several recommendations for DDR programs in general, and the DRC specifically.

1. Think Long Term

DDR is a long-term process and the goal should be the “R”—reintegration—which creates the conditions for ex-combatants to take their place in society as productive and peaceful citizens. The temptation in DDR programs is to focus on demobilization and disarmament because these are short-term efforts and highly measurable; however, demobilization and disarmament are more measures of performance than they are measures of effectiveness. In the end, the goal should be to reintegrate ex-combatants into society and give them incentives to stay demobilized and possibly disarm over the long haul.

¹⁹⁰ McKnight, “Surrendering to the Big Picture,” 5.

Demobilization, in other words, should be a step towards reintegration, not its own goal. As described in Chapter III, and as described previously in this chapter, hundreds of thousands of illegally armed individuals were demobilized in the DRC, but there is little evidence to suggest that these individuals stayed demobilized. Persistent insecurity, lack of jobs, and conflicts within local communities have prevented many of these individuals from moving beyond demobilization to reintegration.

Similarly, focusing on disarmament does not guarantee reduced violence or stability. In countries that have had protracted conflict, weapons tend to be plentiful and focusing on removing all or most weapons from a conflict zone is time consuming, expensive, and ineffective. As the conflict in the DRC has shown, individuals chose to turn in old or non-functioning weapons, rather than truly disarm, thus rendering the disarmament program ineffective.

Focusing on reintegration requires addressing a multitude of problems that go beyond just the illegally armed individual. Most notably, ex-combatants need to have a pathway to earning a living; without a job and the ability to provide for their families, fighters are unlikely to lay down their weapons. However, post-conflict countries often have weak economies and lack opportunities for individuals to earn a living. Furthermore, communities receiving ex-combatants need to be prepared for their return, and find mechanisms for reconciliation and rebuilding trust. Without the buy-in and acceptance of the local population, efforts at truly reintegrating ex-combatants are unlikely to succeed.

Although the DDR programs in the DRC were largely unsuccessful, they offer clues for addressing these long-term reintegration challenges. The first national program attempted to create vocational training for ex-combatants, but ran out of money, which ended these efforts far too soon. International donors could focus on providing funding for job training over time. In particular, the focus could be on initiatives that aim to develop human capital, including the delivery of education, vocational training, farming skills, and so on, for the whole community, and not just for ex-combatants. This one effort—human capital development at the community level—could go far in transforming conflict zones and helping them become more economically productive and harmonious

spaces. In other words, development of human capital could be a vehicle for reintegrating former soldiers as well as rehabilitating communities.

Similarly, jobs programs could be structured in such a way as to reintegrate ex-combatants and work towards reconciliation with communities and societies. The UNDP's fishing cooperatives in Ituri, for example, helped integrate villagers and former combatants through such an initiative. This development project, which focused on demobilizing ex-combatants, benefited both ex-fighters and communities members and helped to motivate peace and harmony in society.

2. Think Holistically—DDR, Security Sector Reform, and Rule of Law

Perhaps the greatest challenge with DDR programs is that they require commitment from other government institutions in order for these programs to be successfully carried out. As McFate and others argue, in a state attempting to end internal conflict, DDR and security sector reform need to happen simultaneously to address shortcomings in government security forces and adequately address illegally armed individuals and groups.¹⁹¹ In the case of the DRC, the country's security forces were small, poorly equipped, and unprofessionally trained, greatly hindering their role in the DDR process. As noted, international donors only committed a tiny fraction of the money allocated for the DDR program to reforming the military of the DRC—USD 14 million versus USD 200 million for other aspects of the DDR program.¹⁹² Clearly, the international community did not see security sector reform as a priority.

Furthermore, in addition to insufficient numbers of properly trained and equipped government forces, the UN mission in the DRC was unable to mobilize sufficient numbers of MONUC forces and deploy them quickly enough to help provide security and oversight of the DDR process. The result was a security vacuum in critical areas, particularly outside major cities, and an inability to successfully identify, repatriate, and demobilize foreign fighters as well as individuals and groups emanating from the DRC. The rushed timeline of the DDR programs, as described earlier, did not allow adequate

¹⁹¹ McFate, "The Link between DDR and SSR in Conflict-affected Countries," 2.

¹⁹² Marriage, "Flip-flop Rebel, Dollar Soldier," 291.

time to mobilize or deploy these forces, nor did it provide time to better train and professionalize DRC forces for the DDR mission.

Alongside security sector reform, the rule of law should be considered as the fundamental ingredient in the overall DDR process. As described in Chapter III and previously in this chapter, the rule of law has all but disappeared in parts of the DRC as a result of protracted conflict and poor governance. In some provinces, government forces are as much a threat to the local population as are illegally armed individuals and groups. Under these conditions, it is an exceedingly difficult environment for the regime to control. Furthermore, the government is hindered from preventing the abuse of power by the security forces, establishing the rule of law, and building trust within the population.

As the DDR programs in the DRC have shown, more time, money, and effort is needed for security sector reform and reestablishing the rule of law as part of an overall DDR program. As with development in human capital, this is a long-term focus that requires a considerable commitment of time and capital in order to achieve these necessary goals.

3. Measures of Success

The DDR programs in the DRC succeeded in demobilizing, disarming, and repatriating individuals, and collecting weapons. The first phase of nationwide DDR program, which ran from October 2004 to December 2006, succeeded in demobilizing 102,014 individuals, disarming 186,000 individuals, and integrating 83,986 individuals into the national army.¹⁹³ The second phase launched in July 2008 and completed in December 2009; this program succeeded in demobilizing 4,782 individuals, disarming 12,820 individuals, and integrating 8,038 individuals into the national army.¹⁹⁴ Alongside these national level DDR efforts, the government initiated a separate program in Ituri province, from September 1, 2004, to June 2005, which succeeded in demobilizing

¹⁹³ Boshoff, "Completing the Demobilisation, Disarmament, and Reintegration Process of Armed Groups in the Democratic Republic of Congo," 3.

¹⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 3.

between 9,000 and 15,811 individuals and collecting 6,200 weapons, of which 70 percent were old and unusable.¹⁹⁵

On its face, the number of individuals repatriated and demobilized is impressive and includes more than 200,000 combatants in total. However, these figures do not provide a true picture of the situation. In many cases, ex-combatants returned to fighting and joined other militant groups. Similarly, the number of weapons collected gives the impression of success, but the quality of the weapons reveals that efforts to disarm were unsuccessful. The next section will propose the right measures of success for the DDR program.

With demobilization, disarmament, and repatriation, the numbers actually present measures of performance and not true measures of success. Measures of performance describe the effort put into trying to fix the problem, such as the amount of money spent, the number of patrols performed, or the number of bullets fired, but not the overall effect these efforts achieved. Similarly, the total number of demobilized, disarmed, and repatriated presented by the DDR program does not capture statistics on those that have returned to fighting or have purchased new weapons. Nor does it say anything about how many foreign fighters remain in the DRC.

Ultimately, the goal of DDR programs is to return fighters to normal, productive roles in society, and to end violence and insecurity. This goal is long-range and dynamic; therefore, it requires regular monitoring over time, not just at one point in history. For better progress toward these goals, this thesis proposes the following measures of success:

- **The overall reduction of violence against civilians in the DRC.** This would include collecting data on politically motivated violence, ethnic violence, criminal violence, violence instigated by government forces, reprisal violence, and any other violence that suggests an insecure environment. A lower level of violence in the DRC should indicate that the country is moving towards stability and security, and that the population could resume normal life in their traditional areas or communities.

¹⁹⁵ Wanki, "Disarming War, Arming Peace."

- **The number of individuals using the court system to resolve major disputes.** This benchmark should reflect greater emphasis on the rule of law, and popular trust in the system and its ability to handle disputes justly. Numbers of individuals using the court system should be an indicator of a willingness to resolve major disputes by means other than violence. This number may also say something about the availability and accessibility of effectively functioning law enforcement, military, and judicial systems in the eastern part of the country. If the population is willing to rely on the legal system to resolve their disputes, it would signal that Congolese government has the capability to deal with disputes and promote the rule of law.
- **An overall reduction and eventual elimination of the number of militias and foreign or local armed groups in the DRC.** A reduction in these forces demonstrates several important steps toward full reintegration. It may indicate that communities no longer feel the need to self-arm to protect themselves from the government and other forces, and the population's "buy-in" to the rule of law and managing conflict through non-violent means. A reduction in illegally armed groups and individuals could also help strengthen the legitimacy of government institutions and reduce ethnic, tribal, and communal military influences on the population.
- **The economic health of the country and its employment opportunities.** The economic health and job potential of the country should be measured at the local, regional, and national levels to gain an accurate picture of economic opportunity for individuals. Specific attention should be paid to the job potential for fighting age men and women, to assure that they have economic alternatives to fighting. Former combatants should also be monitored for job placement and their ability to find self-sustaining and fulfilling employment. The Congolese government could establish follow-up teams at the community level to monitor the progress of the combatants and provide assistance, including job training and placement. This could be done on a monthly basis to assure that ex-combatants are being integrated at the village level.
- **The improvement of human security and physical security in the DRC.** Human and physical security could be measured by the number of children attending primary and secondary schools, and college, reflecting that parents and children feel confident that they can attend school without fear of being abducted by militias or armed groups. Other measures of human security could include access to food and potable water, a reduction in infant mortality rates, and preventable disease reduction in the country. These metrics all point to the government's ability to provide for the general welfare of its population across the country, and build trust between the population and the government.

The Democratic Republic of Congo has suffered from war and poverty for more than two decades. Given these protracted conflicts, the DRC now faces numerous challenges to establishing a stable state, including creating an effective democratic system, building infrastructure designed to support development (educational facilities, hospitals, roads); and strengthening security (border posts, police stations, courthouses, prisons), across the entire country. Despite the enormity of these tasks, the DRC can take steps in the near term aimed at working towards these long-range goals. A longer term, more comprehensive, and reintegration focused DDR program is an important step in this process, and one that financial institutions, donors, and nongovernmental organizations should continue to assist the Congolese government in order to help move the DRC toward becoming a stable state.

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